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INTRODUCTION

The state of employment discrimination practice can be easily
summarized: plaintiffs are losing almost all of the cases they file
except for a few isolated ones, most notably sexual harassment
claims.'
The state of employment discrimination scholarship can be easily
summarized: discrimination is more pervasive than ever, but only
when "discrimination" is defined in a way that few outside the legal
academy are willing to accept.2
The state of employment discrimination doctrine can be easily
summarized: formal proof structures for individual cases of
disparate treatment are being dismantled in favor of a "sufficient
evidence" test that will accord judges and juries, who believe
discrimination is largely a thing of the past, as much freedom as
under prior doctrine to find against plaintiffs.'
To be sure, some hyperbole exists in each of these statements,
but each is largely true; indeed, with the exception of some unjustified optimism about Desert Palace,Inc. v. Costa4 ameliorating the
McDonnell Douglas proof structures for individual disparate
treatment cases,5 each statement is largely undisputed. Certainly,
plaintiffs are increasingly unsuccessful in court,6 and recent
scholarship argues that current approaches inadequately deal with
the discrimination phenomenon.'
This Article's thesis is straightforward: the obsession of the legal
academy and the plaintiffs' bar with disparate treatment cases, to
the wholesale exclusion of the disparate impact alternative, is
largely responsible for the present crisis in the field.8 Disparate
1. See infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 31-59.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 60-116.
4. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
5. Michael J. Zimmer, The New DiscriminationLaw: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1889-91 (2004).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 121-24.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 31-59.
8. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscriinination
Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=701265
(reading recent scholarship as signaling a crisis for employment discrimination, although not
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impact has its own problems, some severe, and this Article is not the
first to call for the theory's revival.9 But the disparate treatment
paradigm's profoundly unsatisfactory history should prompt a
reconsideration of how much effort should be spent trying to salvage
it. Indeed, DesertPalace's chief danger is that it will revive interest
in a failed paradigm. Rather than leading us out of the waste and
into the promised land, Desert Palace may prove to be yet another
mirage.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I sketches an overview of
disparate treatment, the dominant approach to discrimination
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.'" With this structure in
place, Part II then critiques the disparate treatment theory; in the
process, Part II analyzes some of the major efforts to redefine the
theory to make it more effective. Part III then reviews the admittedly checkered history of the disparate impact theory and Part
IV details the criticisms leveled against the theory. Finally, Part V
projects what might be a more hopeful future for disparate impact.

I. DEFINING AND PROVING DISPARATE TREATMENT DISCRIMINATION
One of the antidiscrimination project's pervasive problems has
been the continuing conflation of two separate tasks, that is,
defining discrimination and proving its existence. These tasks are
obviously intimately interrelated, but they are not identical.
Needless to say, discrimination must be defined prior to any effort
to prove its operation in given case.
A. Defining DisparateTreatment Discrimination
Because Title VII bars "discrimination" based on race, sex,
national origin, and religion,1 ' the proscription's reach depends on
agreeing that disparate impact is the solution).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 326-40.
10. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2000).
11. Id. Although this Article focuses on race and sex discrimination, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2000), bars discrimination on
account of age for those forty and older, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 12101 (2000), bars disability discrimination. These prohibited bases for decision are similar
in some respects to race and gender discrimination but different in critical regards. See, e.g.,
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what "discriminate" means. Early in its history, the Supreme Court
adopted two definitions of the term. The first definition, disparate
impact, was announced in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 12 and required
neither proof of motive nor intent on the employer's behalf.1 3
Ironically, the second theory the Court recognized, disparate
treatment, has come to dominate the cases and commentary.
As the Supreme Court described it in InternationalBrotherhood
14
of Teamsters v. United States,
"Disparate treatment" ... is the most easily understood type of

discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin. Proof of discriminatory motive is critical,
although it can in some situations
be inferred from the mere fact
15
of differences in treatment.
Although this formulation is framed in terms of discriminatory
"motive," the Court soon began speaking of discriminatory "intent."
It has continued to use both terms as though they are interchangeable, although intent appears to be the preferred usage, except

Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can Employment
DiscriminationLaw Accommodate the Americans with DisabilitiesAct?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 307,
312-20 (2001); Samuel Issacharoff & Erica Worth Harris, Is Age DiscriminationReally Age
Discrimination?:The ADEA's Unnatural Solution, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 780, 785-86 (1997);
Rhonda M. Reaves, One of These Things Is Not Like the Other:Analogizing Ageism to Racism
in Employment DiscriminationCases, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 839 passim (2004). More recently,
scholars have begun to stress the similarities between different doctrines under different
statutes. E.g., Mary Crossley, Reasonable Accommodation as Part and Parcel of the
AntidiscriminationProject, 35 RUTGERSL.J. 861,864 (2004) ("[R]easonable accommodationslike disparate impact theory-seek simply to remove exclusionary barriers to equal
opportunity."); Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV.
642, 643-46 (2001) (finding similarity between the ADA's duty of reasonable accommodation
and the disparate impact doctrine because both require employers to incur costs to avoid
liability to certain groups).
12. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally infra text accompanying notes 148-54.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 148-54.
14. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
15. Id. at 335 n.15. The Court cited Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing
Development Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977), an equal protection case, thus suggesting the
statutory and constitutional standards were the same. It continued: "Undoubtedly disparate
treatment was the most obvious evil Congress had in mind when it enacted Title VII." Int7
Bhd. of Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
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when "mixed motives" are concerned. 6 Whether the Court intends
them to be synonymous is unclear.'" To the extent a difference
exists, "motive" is broader than "intent" because motives can include
unconscious forces,'" while intent is more often used to describe an
actor's conscious choices.'" The Supreme Court's failure to define
what either term means, or, indeed to explain whether they are
synonymous, is all the more surprising given the scholarly commen-

16. Desert Palace,Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92 (2003), speaks of "mixed motives." See
infra text accompanying notes 84-90; see also McKennon v. Nashville Banner Publ'g Co., 513
U.S. 352, 359-60 (1995) (explaining that "mixed motives" analysis does not apply when the
employer has no prior knowledge of employee wrongdoing); Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507
U.S. 604, 613 (1993) ("flnferring age motivation from the implausibility of the employer's
explanation may be problematic in cases where other unsavory motives, such as pension
interference, were present.").
17. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977,986 (1988) ("In such 'disparate
treatment' cases, ... the plaintiff is required to prove that the defendant had a discriminatory
intent or motive."); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289-90 (1982) ("Discriminatory
intent here means actual motive; it is not a legal presumption to be drawn from a factual
showing of something less than actual motive.").
18. For example, the Oxford English Dictionary (OED) includes the following among the
definitions of "motive": "A circumstance or external factor inducing a person to act in a certain
way; a desire, emotion, reason, argument, etc., influencing or tending to influence a person's
volition. Also: a contemplated end the desire for which influences or tends to influence a
person's actions." OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 698 (1933). In describing "motivation," the
OED also reports that psychology uses the term to include unconscious motives: "orig.
Psychol. The (conscious or unconscious) stimulus for action towards a desired goal, esp. as
resulting from psychological or social factors; the factors giving purpose or direction to human
or animal behaviour ... the reason a person has for acting in a particular way, a motive." Id.
19. See, e.g., Mark S. Brodin, The Role of Fault and Motive in Defining Discrimination:
The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C. L. REV. 943,978-79 (1984) (footnotes omitted):
The notion of intent as "motive" and "purpose" represents a rejection of the
traditional view of intent that prevails in the tort area, in which the term
generally is defined without regard to the actor's motive or underlying purpose,
but is used merely to distinguish conduct that is deliberate and volitional from
conduct that is accidental. Moreover, ... tort intent encompasses not only those
consequences that the actor actually desired, but also those which a reasonable
person would believe are substantially certain to follow from the act. Thus tort
law has objectified the requisite state of mind for its intentional wrongs,
permitting it to be inferred from the circumstances of the act and thus avoiding
the subjective question of actual state of mind.
Professor Brodin uses the example of A voluntarily firing a gun at B; tort law would say A
"intentionally" shot B; his underlying motive "would come into play only in certain limited
circumstances, such as to establish the privilege of self-defense, or to determine whether
punitive damages should be awarded. That A's act was volitional and likely to cause injury
is all that is necessary to make this an 'intentional' tort." Id. at 979.
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tary, which uniformly argues that motive is the more appropriate
term, in part because it may include less conscious impulses.2"
The motive-intent question suggests that this "most easily
understood type of discrimination"'" is not straightforward at all but
rather requires clarification. The Court soon established that
certain motivations, such as animus or disdain, were not essential
to a violation: although sufficient, proof of such motives was not
necessary for discrimination under Title VII because an employer
discriminates within that statute's meaning if the employer intends
to draw a distinction on prohibited grounds. Consequently, even
admittedly rational, business-oriented judgments are discriminatory
within the statute's meaning if the employer uses the race or gender
criterion to make distinctions. Perhaps the most dramatic examples
are the statute's condemnations of sex distinctions in fetal protection policies22 and employer pension plans,2" even if the distinctions
were premised on what the Court views as real differences between
the sexes.
This description, however, may suggest that the state of mind
necessary for "discrimination" is really "intent" in the sense of
conscious decision making, that is, a choice by a rational actor to use
an individual's race or gender as a basis for allocating employment
benefits or burdens. The "discrimination" Title VII addressed when
first enacted often consisted of formal policies akin to those
manifested in school segregation laws or at least conscious relegation of African Americans to inferior positions in employment
20. The most extended treatment of the question is D. Don Welch, Removing
DiscriminatoryBarriers:Basing DisparateTreatment Analysis on Motive Rather Than Intent,
60 S.CAL. L. REv. 733, 740 (1987), which traces the debate back at least as far as Owen M.
Fiss, A Theory of FairEmployment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV. 235, 297 (1971). But others, both
before and after, have also argued that "motive" is a better word than "intent" to describe the
requisite causal mechanism implicated by the antidiscrimination laws. See, e.g., Brodin, supra
note 19; Mark C. Weber, Beyond Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins: A New Approach to Mixed
Motive Discrimination,68 N.C. L. REV. 495,498 (1990) ("Ordinarily, intentions are immediate
objectives, such as the intent to steal, whereas motives are more basic or underlying
objectives, such as the motive to be wealthy.").
21. Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
22. Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 199 (1991) (treating employer
policy as discriminatory because it differentiated between the sexes even though it was
designed to protect fetuses carried by female employees).
23. City of Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 702 (1978)
(holding that requiring females to contribute more to a pension system because of their longer
life expectancies was illegal).
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hierarchies. In Griggs, for example, Duke Power had an explicit
policy, which it discontinued the day the 1964 Civil Rights Act
became effective, segregating blacks in the lowest paid, most menial
positions in the plant.2 4 Similarly, women were also often explicitly
treated differently than men.25 Although Congress undoubtedly
anticipated that the impulses that led to these policies would be
manifested in more ad hoc employment decisions, this kind of
conscious decision making was the primary evil the statute
addressed.2 6
In 1964, Congress recognized that discrimination is not always a
conscious choice,27 however, and the psychological impulses causing
individuals to differentiate based on race have become far better
understood in the forty years since the passage of Title VII.
Relatively early in the statute's history, the notion of stereotyping
was recognized, that is, the tendency to treat members of a class as
having the perceived characteristics of a class. Stereotyping can be
rational or irrational depending on the stereotype's accuracy in
terms of actual group characteristics,2" although even rational
stereotyping is legally and morally problematic because it treats
24. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 428 (1971).
25. The most overt example of formal policies with regard to women was help-wanted
classified advertisements in newspapers, which were categorized as "Male Help Wanted" and
"Female Help Wanted." See Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations,
413 U.S. 376, 379 (1973).
26. See Alfred W. Blumrosen, Strangers in Paradise:Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and the
Concept of Employment Discrimination,71 MICH. L. REV. 59, 67-68 (1972) ("Initially, the
dominant if not exclusive definition of discrimination was based upon the evil-motive ... test.").
27. Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the PersonalAnimosity Presumptionin Title
VIIand the Return to "No Cause"Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1192 (2003) (stating that
Congress in the 1960s was "aware that discrimination was not always overt").
28. Use of accurate stereotypes has been described as statistical discrimination. See David
A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discriminationin Employment: The Case for
Numerical Standards,79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1622 (1991) ("A rational employer will discriminate,
even if no relevant actor has any discriminatory animus, if the employer concludes that race
is a useful proxy for job qualifications."). There has also been lively theoretical literature,
regarding whether and how discrimination could survive in a competitive economy,
originating with the work of Gary Becker, who posits an employer "taste for discrimination"
that overcomes competitive pressures to hire minorities and women. GARY BECKER, THE
ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 525-26 (2d ed. 1977) (exploring the economic ramifications of preferences
for certain racial groups). But see Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination:The Nature of
ClassAction Employment DiscriminationLitigationandIts Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249, 1251
(2003) (doubting whether Becker's theory is empirically supported).
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employees as members of a group rather than assessing their
individual characteristics. Stereotyping can also be more or less
conscious. Some stereotypes-women with preschool age children
have worse attendance records than other workers because of their
responsibilities, for instance-have been the basis of formal policies
clearly driven by intent, however defined.29 The salient scholarly
development during the last decade, however, has been exploring
the extent to which such stereotyping operates below the conscious
level. Although the phenomenon has been studied since at least the
1970s, 30 recent research has revealed both how deep-rooted in
cognitive structures attitudes regarding race and gender are and
how sweepingly such influences can operate. Scholars, such as
Linda Krieger,"' Tristin Green, 32 Susan Sturm,3 3 and others, 34 argue
29. E.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 544 (1971) (invalidating a policy
against hiring women with preschool age children, presumably because of perceived problems
of absenteeism and lateness related to child-care duties).
30. E.g., Nadine Taub, Keeping Women in Their Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of
Employment Discrimination,21 B.C. L. REV. 345, 355 (1980) ('Despite the fairly persuasive
evidence that bias occurs in both subjective and objective evaluations, several factors make
it quite difficult to identify in actual operation. Bias is, first of all, frequently unconscious.").
But see James F. Blumstein, Defining Discrimination:Intent Vs. Impact, 16 NEw PERSP. 29,
33 (1984) ("[The concept of 'unintentional discrimination' is, upon scrutiny, analytically
incongruous.").
31. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:A Cognitive Bias Approach
to Discriminationand Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (1995),
was the groundbreaking effort in this area, although her work was foreshadowed by Charles
R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning with Unconscious Racism,
39 STAN. L. REv. 317 (1987).
32. See Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of DisparateTreatment Theory, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91, 92 (2003) [hereinafter
Green, Workplace Dynamics] ("[B]oth conscious and unconscious bias operate at multiple
levels of social interaction, often resulting in decreased opportunity for disfavored groups
without producing a single, identifiable discriminatory decision or a perceptibly hostile work
environment."); Tristin K. Green, Work Culture and Discrimination,93 CAL. L. REV. 623,647
(2005) [hereinafter Green, Work Culture] (examining how "work cultures are likely to develop
and persist along racial and gender lines" and exposing the harms that those cultures can
impose on women and minorities).
33. See Susan Sturm, Second Generation Employment Discrimination:A Structural
Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 460 (2001) (arguing that "second generation
manifestations of workplace bias are structural, relational, and situational").
34. E.g., Jody Armour, Stereotypes and Prejudice: Helping Legal Decisionmakers Break
the Prejudice Habit, 83 CAL. L. REV. 733, 737-38 (1995); see also VIRGINIA VALIAN, WHY SO
SLOW? THE ADVANCEMENT OF WOMEN (1998); Gary Blasi, Advocacy Against the Stereotype:
Lessons from Cognitive Social Psychology, 49 UCLA L. REV. 1241, 1243-44 (2002); Martha
Chamallas, Deepening the Legal Understanding of Bias: On Devaluation and Biased
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that discrimination in the new millennium is both more pervasive
and less conscious than the aversion Title VII originally targeted in
1964. a5 This insight, though labeled differently,36 has been generally
Prototypes, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 747, 753-55 (2001); Jerry Kang, Trojan Horses of Race, 118
HARv. L. REv. 1489, 1493-97 (2005); Ann C. McGinley, iViva La Evoluci6n!: Recognizing
Unconscious Motive in Title VII, 9 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLlY 415, 417-18 (2000); Barbara F.
Reskin, The Proximate Causes of Employment Discrimination,29 CONTEMP. SOC. 319, 320
(2000); Michael Selmi, Subtle Discrimination:A Matter of PerspectiveRather than Intent, 34
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 657, 668 (2003); Katherine V.W. Stone, The New Psychological
Contract:Implicationsof the Changing Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 519 (2001).
35. The Implicit Association Test (IAT) hosted at Harvard and available on the Internet
offers an opportunity to test one's own cognitive structures. Project Implicit,
https://implicit.harvard. edu/implicit (last visited Nov. 26, 2005); see Mahzarin R. Banaji, The
Opposite of a Great Truth Is Also True: Homage to Koan #7, in PERSPECTIVISM IN SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY: THE YIN AND YANG OF SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 127, 130-38 (John Jost et al. eds.,
2004) (exploring the association between implicit and explicit social cognition); John F.
Dovidio, Kerry Kawakami & Samuel L. Gaertner, Implicit and Explicit Prejudice and
InterracialInteraction,82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 62 (2002) (examining how implicit
and explicit racial attitudes and assumptions predict behavior); Brian A. Nosek, Harvesting
Implicit GroupAttitudes and Beliefs from a DemonstrationWeb Site, 6 GROUP DYNAMICS 101,
101-02 (2002) (reporting results from some 600,000 tests which confirm a much larger implicit
preference among whites for whites than their explicit preferences); see also Reshma M.
Saujani, 'The Implicit Association Test" A Measure of Unconscious Racism in Legislative
Decision-Making, 8 MICH. J. RACE & L. 395 (2003) (arguing for use of the IAT to detect
discriminatory motive in legislation).
Professor Kang describes the IAT as "the state-of-the-art measurement tool," and reports
that functional magnetic resonance imaging tests reflect amygdala activation in test subjects
that "is significantly correlated with participants' IAT scores." Kang, supranote 34, at 1509,
1511. According to Kang, this is significant largely because the amygdala "becomes active
when it is exposed to stimuli with emotional significance." Id. at 1511.
Even assuming the IAT accurately identifies attitudes, however, proof that individuals have
certain attitudes is not necessarily proof that real world decisions are influenced by those
attitudes. For that, it is important to link "laboratory" proof such as the IAT to more real
world experiments such as those reported in Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are
Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha and Jamal?A Field Experiment on Labor
Market Discrimination2-3 (MIT Dep't of Econ., Working Paper No. 03-22, 2003), availableat
http://ssrn.com/abstract id=422902 (reporting that when identical resumes were sent to
employers, those receiving more favorable treatment were those containing non-African
American sounding names). See also Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism,
Outgroup Favoritism, and Their Behavioral Manifestations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143 (2004)
(collecting research showing biased behavior in employment situations).
36. Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a DangerousCondition on Land?, 7 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 459, 465-67 (2003), notes inconsistencies in the terms used in discussing
cognitive bias and suggests a taxonomy. Although his classifications clarify a number of
matters, some are problematic. For example, although Professor Poirier clearly does not
intend this result, stating that "[i]nvidious intent or animus, when acted on, results in
'intentional discrimination,"' id. at 467, may mislead by suggesting that "invidious"
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accepted as playing a major role in present-day America,37 although
a serious question remains about the extent to which "old-fashioned"
animus continues to operate. 8
Whether these developments, which occurred long after Title VII
was passed, will influence the interpretation of what it means to
"discriminate" under the statute is unclear. When the Teamsters
Court wrote about a "discriminatory motive" being necessary for
disparate treatment discrimination,3 9 it probably meant conscious
impulses of the actor. Nevertheless, the Court could easily bring
unconscious discrimination within the disparate treatment model
by looking to its own cases,4 ° stressing the word "motive," and
focusing on the "because of" language in the statutory prohibition.4 '
The shift in vocabulary from "motive" to "intent" in the wake of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, may not be accidental,4 2 and the
Court might well draw the line at conscious conduct for a variety of
reasons. One reason is simply intuition. As two commentators

motivations are critical to finding discrimination, given the relatively uniform equation by
cases and commentators of intentional discrimination with disparate treatment regardless
of animus.
37. As Professor Krieger writes, "[t]hese subtle forms of bias, I suggest, represent today's
most prevalent type of discrimination." Krieger, supra note 31, at 1164.
38. See Michael Selmi, Sex Discriminationin the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies
in the Preservationof Male Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'YJ. 1, 4 (2005) ('[There
remains a significant amount of discrimination in the workplace that is not properly labeled
as subtle but which involves the active and conscious exclusion of women from the
workplace."). Indeed, Professor Selmi suggests that the instinctive reaction to treat instances
of more conscious discrimination as aberrational may itself "reflect the very societal
perception regarding the persistence of discrimination that these cases directly challenge. In
other words, these cases appear abberational not because they are but because they fail to
comport with our image of the changed nature of discrimination." Id. at 25.
39. Intl Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977).
40. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins is replete with examples of stereotypical thinking by the
defendant, but the Court did not focus on whether the stereotypes were conscious,
unconscious, or somewhere in between. 490 U.S. 228, 235-36 (1989). In Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank & Trust,487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988), Justice O'Connor's opinion approving the application
of disparate impact to subjective practices might suggest that disparate impact is necessary
because disparate treatment is unavailable for unconscious bias. See infratext accompanying
note 304.
41. See Krieger, supra note 31, at 1242 ("To establish liability for disparate treatment
discrimination, a Title VII plaintiff would simply be required to prove that his group status
played a role in causing the employer's action or decision. Causation would no longer be
equated with intentionality.").
42. See infra text accompanying note 107.
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pithily stated, "[u]nconscious intent seems oxymoronic. 4 3 Some
commentators claim that unconscious discrimination should not be
actionable" because little can be done about it and/or efforts to
change such deep-seated views are likely to be more costly than they
are worth.45
Still another way in which "the most easily understood" variety
of discrimination is not so easily understood is the extent to which
a factor the employer uses to differentiate among employees is
deemed to be "racial" or "gender" in nature. Obviously, a sign that
said "No Blacks Need Apply" would signal an intent to reject any
member of that race. But requiring correct pronunciation, for
example, is more ambiguously "racial," even if "aks" would draw
more criticism under such a policy than would "nucular." This topic
is sometimes denominated "trait"discrimination,4 6 and is related to,
but distinct from, what "intent" means. In other words, the motive
for the policy might reflect aversion to a group that the decision
maker is not even aware, but it may also reflect an even more subtle
kind of bias, such as a preference for traits more typical of whites or
males. Trait discrimination, then, requires determining the extent

43. Rebecca Hanner White & Linda Hamilton Krieger, Whose Motive Matters?:
Discriminationin Multi-Actor Employment Decision Making, 61 LA. L. REV. 495, 506 (2001).
44. See Amy L. Wax, Discriminationas Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129, 1132-33 (1999). But
see Michael Selmi, Response to Professor Wax, Discriminationas Accident: Old Whine, New
Bottle, 74 IND. L.J. 1233 (1999); White & Krieger, supra note 43, at 498-99 ('Title VII should
be interpreted, and the Supreme Court's decisions can and should be read, as rejecting a
requirement of conscious intent," but "lower courts continue to search for conscious intent.");
Banaji, supranote 35, at 135 (stating that relatively minor variations in social situation can
play an important role in implicit attitudes).
45. But see Christine Jolls & Cass R. Sunstein, Debiasing Through Law (John M. Olin
Law & Econ. Working Paper Series, Paper No. 225, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstractid=590929 (claiming that employment discrimination regimes carry the
potential-already achieved to some degree-to achieve some important measure of debiasing
through substantive law, including achieving a diverse supervisory workforce through
affirmative action and sexual harassment's limits on sexually oriented pictures and activity
in the workplace).
46. E.g., Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hair Piece: Perspectiveson the Intersectionof Race and
Gender, 1991 DUKE L.J. 365, 370 (exploring the "way in which a black woman's hair is related
to the perpetuation of social, political, and economic domination of subordinated racial and
gender groups"); Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Sex Discrimination:An
Argument Against Neutrality, 83 TEx. L. REV. 167 passim (2004) (arguing for a response to
trait discrimination reflecting Title VII's original focus on ending status-based hierarchy).
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to which the antidiscrimination laws protect individuals from
manifesting their "identity" in race- or gender-related ways.4 7
By and large, the courts have been unsympathetic to attempts to
expand the notion of race discrimination to encompass behaviors
commonly associated with, but not inherent in, particular races.
Similarly, whether a policy limiting the use of a foreign language is
national origin discrimination has been recurrently debated, with
the courts generally holding that limitations on employees speaking
first languages, other than English, do not constitute such discrimination."

47. Devon Carbado and Mitu Gulati have devoted a series of articles to "identity," arguing
that discrimination often is directed at those who "work" a black (or Asian) identity; in
contrast, African American or Asian American individuals who signal adoption of "white"
values and lifestyle are treated like whites. Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, The Fifth Black
Woman, 11 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSuES 701, 703 (2001) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati, Black
Woman (arguing that intersectionality theory does not capture discrimination based on how
individuals "perform" their identity in the workplace); Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati,
Working Identity, 85 CORNELL L. REv. 1259, 1262 (2000) [hereinafter Carbado & Gulati,
Working Identity] (stating "[b]ecause members of these groups are often likely to perceive
themselves as subject to negative stereotypes, they are also likely to feel the need to do
significant amounts of "extra" identity work to counter those stereotypes.... [T]hat extra work
may not only result in significant opportunity costs, but may also entail a high level of risk.");
Barbara J. Flagg, Fashioning a Title VII Remedy for Transparently White Subjective
Decisionmaking,104 YALE L.J. 2009, 2034 (1995) (asserting that the argument that race
should not be implicated when an individual chooses not to conform to the dominant culture
"is problematic because it reiterates the transparency error. Because it underestimates the
centrality of race to personal identity for people who are not white, it incorrectly assumes that
the identity costs of conformity to the norms of a white cultural setting for a black person are
commensurate with the identity costs incurred by a white person required to conform in the
same setting."); see also Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 779 (2002) (arguing that
by not protecting identity, the antidiscrimination laws have an "assimilationist bias" that
tends to require groups protected by the statutes to engage in compulsory assimilation).
48. E.g., Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding an Englishonly rule as applied to bilingual employees against challenges based on disparate impact and
hostile work environment theory); Garcia v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270 (5th Cir. 1980)
(upholding rule requiring bilingual sales personnel to speak only English on the job). See
generally Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, How the Garcia Cousins Lost Their Accents:
Understanding the Language of Title VII Decisions Approving English-Only Rules as the
Productof RacialDualism, LatinoInvisibility,and Legal Indeterminacy,85 CAL. L. REV. 1347,
1353-58 (1998) (arguing that the exclusion of English-only rules from the ambit of Title VII
national origin discrimination results from jurisprudential prejudice and relegates Latinos
to second-class legal status); Juan F. Perea, Ethnicity and Prejudice:Reevaluating "National
Origin" Discrimination Under Title VII, 35 WM. & MARY L. REv. 805, 808 (1994) ("[T]he
'national origin' term does not, and cannot, correctly encompass the protection of ethnic traits
or ethnicity.").
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Although some scholars call for legal sensitivity to these kinds of
identity manifestations,4 9 other commentators respond that any
effort in this direction risks racial or gender essentialism, that is,
the notion that individuals are defined by the group to which they
belong.'
As suggested, the courts have not been clear in their rationalizations for refusing to extend the concept of discrimination to embrace
traits and practices common to, but not inherent in, particular
races, national origins, or genders. The law, of course, recognizes
that discriminating against all members of a group is not necessary
to violate the statute. In its first Title VII decision, Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp., ' the Supreme Court held that a policy
against hiring women with preschool age children was sex discrimination, even though women were often hired.5 2 But Martin
Marietta's version of "sex plus" discrimination (sex plus another
49. E.g., Perea, supra note 48.
50. See Roberto J. Gonzalez, Note, CulturalRights and the Immutability Requirement in
DisparateImpact Doctrine,55 STAN. L. REv. 2195, 2198 (2003).
[Establishing a legal] regime of cultural rights calls upon the courts to engage
in the essentialist endeavor of tracing the metes and bounds of a given identity
group in order to determine which cultural traits are deserving of legal
protection. Even if a court could resolve the conflicting claims over which traits
are essential to a group's identity-and even if a court could separate the
empowering narratives of identity from those that are repressive-recognizing
cultural rights would nonetheless solidify one version of the group's identity over
others and bolster the notion that groups have essences. And once the "truth" of
each identity group is codified into the law, it would come to subtly shape the
lives, both within and outside the group, of those persons the law purported to
describe.
Id.; see also Richard T. Ford, Beyond "Difference".A Reluctant Critique of Legal Identity
Politics, in LEFT LEGALIsM/LEFT CRITIQUE 38 (Wendy Brown & Janet E. Halley eds., 2002);
Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Discrimination as Race Discrimination:An Argument About
Assimilation, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).
51. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
52. Id. at 544. At the time when plaintiff was denied employment because she had young
children "70-75% of the applicants for the position she sought were women; [and] 75-80% of
those hired for the position, assembly trainee, were women, hence no question of bias against
women as such was presented." Id. at 543; see also Carbado & Gulati, Working Identity, supra
note 47, at 1298 n.106 ("Little hope exists, however, that the sex-plus category will be
extended to cover anything but a narrow range of performances" because the courts have been
hostile to extensions of the doctrine "to cover day-to-day performances of identity, like dress,
appearance, and language."). See generally Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate
Treatment: The Ghost of Martin Marietta, 44 VILL. L. REV. 337 (1999) (discussing "motherdiscrimination" and hypothesizing that there are few cases because it is difficult for plaintiffs
to win).
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characteristic equals sex discrimination) reaches only cases in which
all victims of a particular policy are of one sex, even though other
members of the same sex are not victims. It does not reach the
situation in which individuals of different protected groups share
the trait in question, although the trait is more typical of one
53
group.
The Supreme Court most directly confronted this question in two
cases that strongly suggest a narrow approach to trait discrimination. In Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins,5 4 the Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to label the employer's reliance on his pension status
as evidence of age discrimination. Although an "employer cannot
rely on age as a proxy for an employee's remaining characteristics,
such as productivity," a decision that is "wholly motivated by factors
other than age ... [is not subject to the Act because] the problem of
inaccurate and stigmatizing stereotypes disappears. This is true
even if the motivating factor is correlated with age, as pension
status typically is."55 One wonders what the Court would do with an
employer who refused to hire people with wrinkles or liver spots: is
this age discrimination or merely a factor correlated with age?
Similarly, in General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,56 a decision later
legislatively overruled, the Court refused to treat discrimination
based on pregnancy as sex discrimination 7 despite the obvious fact
that only women get pregnant. Both Biggins and Gilbert recognized
53. This is, of course, a thumbnail description of disparate impact. See discussion infra
beginning at note 148.
54. 507 U.S. 604 (1993).
55. Id. at 611.
56. 429 U.S. 125 (1977), superseded by statute, Act of Oct. 31, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-555,
92 Stat. 2076.
57. Quoting from a prior Equal Protection case, the Court in Gilbert wrote:
'The lack of identity between the excluded disability and gender as such under
this insurance program becomes clear upon the most cursory analysis. The
program divides potential recipients into two groups-pregnant women and
nonpregnant persons. While the first group is exclusively female, the second
includes members of both sexes."
Th[is] ... language from Geduldig leaves no doubt that our reason for rejecting
appellee's equal protection claim in that case was that the exclusion of
pregnancy from coverage under California's disability-benefits plan was not in
itself discrimination based on sex.
429 U.S. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 496-97 n.20 (1974)) (citation
omitted). Gilbertis obviously in considerable tension with Martin Marietta because it can be
viewed as holding that sex-plus-pregnancy is not actionable.
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that the formal differentiating principle-pension status or
pregnancy-would be actionable if it reflected intent to discriminate
on the prohibited grounds of age or sex, but both cases rejected per
se equating of the differentiating principle with the prohibited
ground. Indeed, discrimination based on correlated traits was
actionable only if it was a "pretext" for discrimination on the
prohibited ground,5" or at least reflected a judgment by the employer
to equate the differentiating principle with the prohibited grounds.5 9
In sum, "the most easily understood" form of discrimination,
disparate treatment, may not be so easily understood after all. What
"intent" means and what constitutes a racial or gender criterion
remain puzzling questions.
B. ProvingIndividualDisparateTreatment Discrimination
If discrimination, in the disparate treatment sense, means an
employment action caused by "intent" to discriminate, the obvious
question is how to prove that a particular action was so actuated.
The continuing saga of disparate treatment proof structures has
been retold numerous times, but warrants revisiting briefly given
the potential changes in analyzing individual disparate impact cases
signaled by the Supreme Court's recent decision in Desert Palace,
Inc. v. Costa.6 °
The story commences with McDonnell Douglas v. Green,61 which
established a three-step analytical structure for cases that later
became known as "single motive" or "circumstantial" evidence cases.
The first step requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie case
of discrimination, that is, to put on enough evidence to create a
presumption that the employer discriminated." Once the prima
58. Id. at 135 (quoting Geduldig v. Aiello 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974)) ("We recognized in
Geduldig ... that the fact that there was no sex-based discrimination as such was not the end
of the analysis, should it be shown 'that distinctions involving pregnancy are mere pretexts
designed to effect an invidious discrimination against the members of one sex or the other."').
59. Biggins, 507 U.S. 613 ("Pension status may be a proxy for age, not in the sense that
the ADEA makes the two factors equivalent ... but in the sense that the employer may
suppose a correlation between the two factors and act accordingly.") (citation omitted).
60. 539 U.S. 90 (2003) (adopting a plain-meaning approach to reading § 703(m) in
disparate treatment cases); see discussion infra beginning at note 92.
61. 11 U.S. 792, 802-04 (1973).
62. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) (footnote omitted).
Establishment of the prima facie case in effect creates a presumption that the
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facie case is established, the employer, at the second step, has the
burden of production to put into evidence a nondiscriminatory
reason for the alleged discriminatory decision. Finally, the plaintiff
has the opportunity in the third step to prove that the supposed
reason was really a pretext for an underlying discriminatory
motivation.
This analytical structure's significance has evolved over the years.
The McDonnell Douglas Court noted that the prima facie case it
detailed was only one way of stating such a case. 3 Indeed, the
famous four prongs of the prima facie case were tailored to the
relatively unusual facts before the Court, namely an employer's
refusal to rehire a qualified black former employee when the job in
question remained vacant.' Although the McDonnellDouglasCourt
explicitly recognized that its formulation of prima facie proof would
need to be modified for other situations,6" lower courts have often
employer unlawfully discriminated against the employee. If the trier of fact
believes the plaintiffs evidence, and if the employer is silent in the face of the
presumption, the court must enter judgment for the plaintiff because no issue
of fact remains in the case.
Id. The Court repeated this theme in St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks:
At the close of the defendant's case, the court is asked to decide whether an issue
of fact remains for the trier of fact to determine. None does if, on the evidence
presented, (1) any rational person would have to find the existence of facts
constituting a prima facie case, and (2) the defendant has failed to meet its
burden of production-i.e., has failed to introduce evidence which, taken as true,
would permit the conclusion that there was a nondiscriminatory reason for the
adverse action. In that event, the court must award judgment to the plaintiff as
a matter of law ....
509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).
Professor Risinger believes it would be more accurate to describe this as a fixed standard
of sufficiency rather than a "presumption." Under McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie case,
if accepted by the factfinder, mandates judgment for the plaintiff if the defendant does not
meet its burden of production. Thus, McDonnell Douglas, in essence, establishes that certain
proof is sufficient for a judgment for plaintiff, whether or not the proof would require or even
permit a finding of the underlying fact-that the defendant intended to discriminate.
63. McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802 n.13.
64. The plaintiff must establish
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for
a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his
qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802 (footnote omitted).
65. Id. at 802 n. 13 ("The facts necessarily will vary in Title VII cases, and the specification
above of the prima facie proof required from respondent is not necessarily applicable in every
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disagreed about what evidence constitutes a prima facie case in
other contexts. 6' As since rationalized by the Court, the prima facie
case requires merely that a minority member or woman has been
denied an employment opportunity in circumstances where the most
obvious innocent explanations, such as plaintiff's lack of qualifications or the absence of an opening, are inapplicable. As the Court
explained in a later case, "A prima facie case under McDonnell
Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not
based on the consideration of impermissible factors."67 Therefore,
the plaintiff at the prima facie stage need not negate all the possible
or perhaps even all the probable legitimate reasons nor must the
plaintiff adduce more "direct" evidence. In short, the first step of
McDonnell Douglas, the prima facie case, has always required little
proof.
The prima facie case's bare bones requirement may explain the
Court's limited requirements for the second stage of the McDonnell
Douglas analytical structure: once a plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case, the defendant has only a burden of production to put into
evidence a nondiscriminatory reason. This does not shift from the
plaintiff the burden of persuasion as to the existence of discrimina-

respect to differing factual situations.").
66. See generally Parisis G. Filippatos & Sean Farhang, The Rights of Employees
Subjected to Reductions in Force: A Critical Evaluation, 6 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 263
(2002) (classifying court decisions treating reductions in force). Another arena in which this
debate plays out is whether a plaintiff has to identify a white "comparator" or comparators
who were treated better than plaintiff to make out a prima facie case. There is an emerging
literature on who counts as a comparator, usually framed in terms of what employees are
"similarly situated" to the plaintiff. See generally Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts' Misuse of
the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 67 Mo. L. REV. 831 (2002)
(arguing that courts should not impose a similarly situated requirement). By definition, the
more alike a putative comparator is to the plaintiff, except for race, the fewer nonracial
reasons exist to explain a particular decision; but the point at which a co-worker is different
enough from a plaintiff to cease to be a comparator will vary depending on perceptions of the
relative likelihood of discrimination compared to other reasons for adverse actions.
67. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978). The Court has not retreated
from this view, although it is important more as a heuristic than as a litigation principle.
Once the defendant has put in evidence of its nondiscriminatory reason, the "presumption"
disappears. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 507. While the factfinder may still decide for plaintiff, it may
do so because of inferences drawn from the evidence supporting the prima facie case and the
implausibility of the defendant's nondiscriminatory reason, not because of any "presumption"
(or fixed rule of sufficiency) that arises from that prima facie case.
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tion.6" Only if the defendant fails to adduce any evidence does
plaintiff necessarily win. The requirements the defendant must
meet are thus minimal: first, the nondiscriminatory reason must be
put into evidence and not just argued6 9 and second, the nondiscriminatory reason must not be too vague, as some courts have rejected
nondiscriminatory reasons for vagueness."0
All the work of McDonnell Douglas, therefore, falls on the third
stage, the pretext stage, where the plaintiff bears the burden of
persuasion in proving that the employer's asserted nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual. Further, the plaintiff must not only prove
that the supposed nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext but also
that the true reason for the challenged decision is discrimination. In
short, the plaintiff must persuade the factfinder that the challenged
decision was the result of a discriminatory motivation. A plaintiff
cannot merely prove that the defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual in the sense that it is untrue; rather a
plaintiff must also persuade the factfinder that that reason is a
pretext for discrimination.7 1 However, in Reeves v. Sanderson
PlumbingProducts,Inc.,7 2 the Court made clear that the factfinder's
disbelief of the defendant's asserted reason will usually be a
sufficient basis for concluding that the defendant disguised a
discriminatory motivation.7" This holding, coupled with Reeves'
68. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,256 (1981) ('CThe plaintiff retains
the burden of persuasion. She now must have the opportunity to demonstrate that the
proffered reason was not the true reason for the employment decision. This burden now
merges with the ultimate burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of
intentional discrimination.").
69. Id. at 255 n.9 ("An articulation not admitted into evidence will not suffice. Thus, the
defendant cannot meet its burden merely through an answer to the complaint or by argument
of counsel.").
•70. E.g., Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 316-17 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding that an employer's
statement that the employee was not "sufficiently suited" was not specific enough to meet its
burden of production); Iadimarco v. Runyon, 190 F.3d 151, 166-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that
an assertion that successful candidate was "the right person for the job" is "not a race-neutral
explanation at all, and allowing it to suffice to rebut a prima facie case of discriminatory
animus is tantamount to a judicial repeal of the very protections Congress intended under
Title VII").
71. Hicks, 509 U.S. at 515 ("[A] reason cannot be proved to be 'a pretext for discrimination'
unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real
reason.").
72. 520 U.S. 133 (2000).
73. Id. at 148-49:
Whether judgment as a matter of law is appropriate in any particular case will
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emphasis on considering all the evidence, including that supporting
the prima facie case, was of great assistance to plaintiffs.7 4
The low threshold for the plaintiff's prima facie case originally
rested on the unremarkable proposition when the case was decided
that employers frequently discriminated against blacks, women, or
other minorities. Professor Deborah Calloway has labeled this the
"basic assumption" underlying the proof structure, and she is
certainly correct that this belief animated the original McDonnell
Douglasdecision.7 5 Accordingly, a minority plaintiff was required to
demonstrate only that the most common reasons for an employment
decision were not applicable in the case. Once the plaintiffs proof
ruled out those common reasons, the factfinder could appropriately
infer that race was the reason for the employer's action. Indeed,
should the factfinder believe plaintiffs proof, the factfinder was
required to find discrimination, unless the employer put into
evidence other 'legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons" for its
actions.76 But, should the defendant carry that burden of production,
the defendant would prevail unless the plaintiff could establish that
those other reasons were not the true reasons for the employer's
actions, and, by inference, that they were pretexts for the true racerelated reason.
depend on a number of factors.... For purposes of this case, we need not-and
could not-resolve all of the circumstances in which such factors would entitle
an employer to judgment as a matter of law. It suffices to say that, because a
prima facie case and sufficient evidence to reject the employer's explanation may
permit a finding of liability, the Court of Appeals erred in proceeding from the
premise that a plaintiff must always introduce additional, independent evidence
of discrimination.
74. Id. at 152 ("Mhe court disregarded critical evidence favorable to petitioner-namely,
the evidence supporting petitioner's prima facie case and undermining respondent's
nondiscriminatory explanation. The court also failed to draw all reasonable inferences in favor
of petitioner." (citation omitted)). This validates commentators such as Professor Zimmer who
had objected to the "slicing and dicing" approach that proof structures permitted, if not
encouraged. Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing Individual Disparate Treatment Law, 61
LA. L. Rev. 577 (2001).
75. See generallyDeborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioningthe
Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 997-98, 1007-08 (1994) (identifying the assumption
of discrimination and concluding that the Court no longer "truly believe[s]" in that inference).
Deborah Malamud, The Last Minuet:DisparateTreatmentAfter Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229,
2260 (1995), questions whether the basic assumption was ever justifiable but does not
question the accuracy of Professor Calloway's description of the underlying rationale of the
McDonnell Douglasprima facie case.
76. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
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In most cases, however, the plaintiffs proof that the defendant's
proffered reason was not the true reason is sufficient for, though
does not require, the factfinder to draw the inference that the true
reason was the plaintiffs race.77 This is true in part because the
defendant's failure to put into evidence a credible nondiscriminatory
reason may suggest that the real reason is discrimination.78 But it
is also true in part because the continued prevalence of discrimination in our society suggests that, when other reasons are ruled out,
prejudice is a natural inference, although not the only possible
inference. 79 Again, the basic assumption emerges. Professor Zimmer,
therefore, describes the McDonnell Douglas approach as a process
of elimination: as progressively more nondiscriminatory reasons are
eliminated, discrimination becomes progressively more likely.8"
77. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (citation omitted) ("Proof that the defendant's explanation is
unworthy of credence is simply one form of circumstantial evidence that is probative of
intentional discrimination, and it may be quite persuasive.").
78. The Reeves Court stated:
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer from the
falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to cover up a
discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent with the general
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's
dishonesty about a material fact as "affirmative evidence of guilt...." Moreover,
once the employer's justification has been eliminated, discrimination may well
be the most likely alternative explanation, especially since the employer is in the
best position to put forth the actual reason for its decision.
Id. (citations omitted).
79. Indeed, in extreme cases it may not be even a permissible inference.
This is not to say that such a showing by the plaintiff will always be adequate
to sustain a jury's finding of liability. Certainly there will be instances where,
although the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and set forth sufficient
evidence to reject the defendant's explanation, no rational factfinder could
conclude that the action was discriminatory.
Id. at 148. This is the Court's strongest statement that the prima facie case does not always
provide a sufficient basis to infer discrimination. It truly is merely a fixed rule of sufficiency.
See supranote 67.
80. See Zimmer, supra note 5; see also Michael J. Zimmer, Leading by Example: An
HolisticApproach to IndividualDisparateTreatment Law, 11 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POLY 177, 177
(2001). This is a kind of Bayesian analysis. There are, of course, an infinite number of possible
reasons for any given decision, but there are relatively few likely reasons. The McDonnell
Douglas proof structure can be seen as requiring the plaintiff to rule out the most likely
reasons as part of her prima facie case. Since these reasons are only a small subset of the
possible reasons, although a larger subset of the possible likely reasons, the employer is
required to put in evidence other reasons. If these are in turn ruled out, it may be fair to
permit the trier of fact to conclude that the probability favors an impermissible reason. See
generally D. Michael Risinger & Jeffrey L. Loop, Three Card Monte, Monty Hall, Modus
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After 1989, the McDonnell Douglas proof structure was supplemented by what most courts and commentators viewed as a second
method of proof in individual disparate treatment cases. Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins81 created a separate framework for analyzing
individual disparate treatment cases based on so-called "direct"
evidence of discrimination.82 In addition to the kind of circumstantial evidence long used in McDonnell Douglas cases, the plaintiff in
Price Waterhouse introduced into evidence written evaluations and
oral comments made in the partnership process, which suggested
that the plaintiffs gender played a role in the decision to turn her
down for a partnership in an accounting firm.83 The firm, however,
denied basing its decision on plaintiffs sex, instead insisting she
had been denied partnership because of her lack of interpersonal
skills.' The trial court credited both Hopkins's and the firm's
explanation for her partnership denial; it found that the firm had
relied upon both Hopkins's sex and her deficient interpersonal skills
when denying her partnership.8 5
The Supreme Court was thus confronted with a "mixed motive"
case, one in which the challenged decision implicated both legitimate and discriminatory reasons. Justice Brennan, writing for a
plurality of four, said that the plaintiff need only prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that her gender played "a motivating
part" in the challenged decision."5 Upon that showing, the burden of
persuasion shifted to the defendant to try to avoid liability by
proving as an affirmative defense that it would have made the same

Operandi and "OffenderProfiling" Some Lessons of Modern Cognitive Science for the Law of
Evidence, 24 CARDOZO L. REv. 193, 200 n.15 (2002) ("Bayes' Theorem deals with the
sequential revision of probabilities from a starting point (the initial or prior probability)
through the integration of new probability-affecting information." (citation omitted)).
81. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
82. Id. at 275 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
83. One partner described her as "macho," another said she "overcompensated for being
a woman," and a third advised her to take "a course at charm school." Id. at 235. Further, the
partner who had been on the committee making the decision and who was charged with
telling her that her bid to be a partner had been put on hold counseled her to "walk more
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry." Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 258.
86. Id.
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decision absent the discrimination.17 In a footnote, Justice Brennan
suggested that this holding established an alternative to the
McDonnell Douglas approach for individual disparate treatment
88

cases.

To form a majority of the Court, however, Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion must be examined. s9 Her approach differed from
the plurality in two ways: First, she raised the bar by requiring the
plaintiff to show that the impermissible factor, such as plaintiffs
sex, was a "substantial" (rather than merely a "motivating") factor
in the employer's decision. 0 And, second, to trigger the Price
Waterhouse method of analysis, she required plaintiffs to introduce
"direct" evidence of discrimination.9 ' This "direct" evidence threshold suggested two separate paths for analyzing individual disparate
treatment cases: the old McDonnell Douglas circumstantial
evidence/single motive analysis and the new Price Waterhouse
"direct" evidence/mixed motives analysis.
Congress modified Price Waterhouse in the Civil Rights Act of
1991 by adopting Justice Brennan's articulation of the plaintiffs
burden in showing an impermissible factor influenced the challenged decision." Section 703(m) provides that "an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was
87. Id.
88. Id. at 247 n.12 ("Nothing in this opinion should be taken to suggest that a case must
be correctly labeled as either a 'pretext' case or a 'mixed-motives' case from the beginning....
At some point in the proceedings, of course, the District Court must decide whether a
particular case involves mixed motives.").
89. Justice White also concurred, but the narrowest holding of five members results from
looking to Justice O'Connor's opinion. Id. at 258, 261; see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S.
188, 193 (1977) (holding that, when there is no opinion for a majority of the Court, the holding
is to be ascertained by looking to the narrowest ground upon which five members agree). See
generally Maxwell L. Stearns, The Case for Including Marks v. United States in the Canon
of Constitutional Law, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 321, 322 (2000) (analyzing the "narrowest
grounds doctrine" in Marks).
90. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261-62.
91. Id. at 278.
92. Congress also made a second alteration in the Price Waterhouse approach. That case
had held that defendant's proof that it would have made the same decision even if an
illegitimate consideration had not been a factor would be a complete defense to liability. The
new act, however, narrowed the effect of the defendant's "same decision" proof. It provided
that a violation would occur whenever race (or other prohibited ground) was a motivating
factor but that plaintiffs remedies would be limited if the factor did not change the outcome.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2000).
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a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice."9" Congress, however, did not
explicitly address Justice O'Connor's "direct" evidence threshold
for applying this method of analysis. Perhaps for that reason, and
despite the incoherence of the notion,9 4 lower courts generally continued to require "direct evidence" to trigger the Price Waterhouse
analysis.9 5 This was true even though the amended statute specifies
simply that proof of "a motivating factor" establishes defendant's
liability, which is the core issue in all disparate treatment cases.
Analytically, therefore, the first question in individual disparate
treatment cases in most circuits was whether plaintiff had "direct"
evidence of the employer's intent to discriminate. If the answer was
yes, the Price Waterhouse approach applied. If not, McDonnell
Douglas was the default analysis.'
This dual approach lasted until the Supreme Court's 2003
decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 7 which adopted a plain
meaning approach urged by commentators such as Professor
Zimmer.9" The Court read "a motivating factor" language in § 2000e2(m) to mean that "[iun order to obtain an instruction under
§ 2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for a
reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence,
that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice.""' Direct evidence is no longer
required.100
93. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2000).
94. See Charles A. Sullivan, Accounting for Price Waterhouse: Proving Disparate
Treatment Under Title VII, 56 BROOK. L. REv. 1107, 1137-38, 1157-61 (1991).
95. See, e.g., Watson v. SEPTA, 207 F.3d 207, 217 (3d Cir. 2000); Robert Belton, MixedMotive Cases in Employment DiscriminationLaw Revisited: A Brief Updated View of the
Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651, 657-58 (2000).

96. This statutory structure creates a different kind of presumption than the McDonnell
Douglasversion-it provides for an affirmative defense. That is, once the plaintiff proves that
race is a motivating factor, she has proven defendant's liability. But this proof also creates a
presumption of full relief, a presumption that can be rebutted by the defendant carrying the
burden of persuasion that it would have made the same decision even if it had not been
motivated by race. See Belton, supra note 95, at 657.
97. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
98. Id. at 98-101; see Michael J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate
Treatment DiscriminationLitigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 601-06 (1996).
99. Desert Palace,539 U.S. at 101.
100. Justice O'Connor concurred, reasoning that the 1991 Amendments had legislatively
reversed her approach. Id. at 102 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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The ramifications of Desert Palace are as yet unclear, but the
broadest view is that the case collapsed all individual disparate
treatment cases into a single analytical method, thereby effectively
destroying McDonnell Douglas. The decision, however, can be read
more narrowly. Because footnote one specifies that the Court was
not deciding the effects of this decision "outside of the mixed-motive
context,"'1° McDonnell Douglas may continue to structure some
cases, although its viability under Title VII is suspect."°2
After Price Waterhouse and before Desert Palace, the-distinction
between Price Waterhouse and McDonnell Douglas cases had been
framed in two ways. First, Price Waterhouse cases were "direct
evidence" cases, while McDonnell Douglasapplied to "circumstantial
evidence" cases. Desert Palace explicitly erases this distinction
since circumstantial evidence alone can prove liability using the
"a motivating factor" standard of liability in § 703(m). Therefore,
speaking of Price Waterhouse as "direct" evidence proof or of
McDonnell Douglas as a "circumstantial" or "indirect" method of
proof is no longer appropriate.
The second way of distinguishing the two methods of proof prior
to Desert Palacewas by viewing McDonnell Douglas as involving a
"single motive" and Price Waterhouse as involving "mixed-motives."
Getting to a single discriminatory motive by process of elimination
101. Id. at 94 n.1.
102. The circuit courts have not been ready to inter McDonnell Douglas, although they
have not persuasively justified its survival. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d
733, 735 (8th Cir. 2004).
Desert Palace, a decision in which the Supreme Court decided only a mixed
motive jury instruction issue, is an inherently unreliable basis for district courts
to begin ignoring this Circuit's controlling summary judgment precedents. For
concrete evidence confirming that Desert Palacedid not forecast a sea change in
the Court's thinking, we need look no further than Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,
540 U.S. 44 (2003), a post-DesertPalace decision in which the Court approved
use of the McDonnell Douglas analysis at the summary judgment stage.
Id. (citations omitted). The Griffith court, however did not notice that Raytheon was brought
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, which does not have a parallel to § 703(m). See
Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 46. See also Cooper v. S. Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004).
Mhe DesertPalaceholding was expressly limited to the context of mixed-motive
discrimination cases under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).... Moreover, the fact that the
Court did not even mention McDonnell Douglas in DesertPalacemakes us even
more reluctant to believe that Desert Palace should be understood to overrule
that seminal precedent.
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is the core of McDonnell Douglas, a process that leads the factfinder
to view the case as an either/or proposition: either the defendant's
reason explains the decision or the plaintiffs claim of discrimination
explains it. This distinction, too, now seems untenable. In any
discrimination case that gets to the jury, including a purely
circumstantial evidence case, the jury can find the presence of both
factors, rather than deciding that one party is entirely correct and
the other wrong." 3
Indeed, a decision that has generated substantial criticism from
the plaintiffs bar, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks,0 4 necessarily
points in this direction because it permits the factfinder to make
any determination justified by the record. 0 5 In Hicks itself, the
factfinder concluded that personal animus, not discrimination,
motivated the employer. But the Court's approval of any finding
supported by the record necessarily means that the factfinder could
find that both impermissible and permissible reasons motivated the
challenged decision, even though the parties each claim only one
motivation (the plaintiff claiming a discriminatory motivation while
the defendant claims a nondiscriminatory one).
In short, McDonnell Douglas may be either doctrinally or
functionally dead,'0 6 at least if either party raises the issue.
103. See Rowland v. Am. Gen. Fin., Inc., 340 F.3d 187, 193 (4th Cir. 2003) (granting new
trial to plaintiff because the district court failed to give a mixed-motive jury instruction); Dare
v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987,991 (D. Minn. 2003) ("[B]ecause the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 unambiguously prohibits any degree of consideration of a plaintiffs race, gender
or other enumerated classification in making an employment decision, it must also extend to
single-motive claims.").
104. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
105. Hicks permitted the trial judge to disbelieve both the plaintiffs claim of discrimination
and the defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory reason. Id. at 511. The court below had
determined that personal animosity, not discrimination, explained the adverse decision, even
though the individual defendant denied such animosity. Id. at 542 (Souter, J., dissenting). The
Court thus partially based its judgment on a fact claimed by neither party. The narrow
holding of Hicks was that disbelief of the supposed nondiscriminatory reason was not
necessarily sufficient; the trier of fact had to find not merely that the defendant's reason was
pretextual but that it was a pretext for discrimination. But the broader holding of the case is
that the trier of fact can make any determination justified by the record before it. It would
necessarily follow that a jury could disbelieve both plaintiffs claim that discrimination
entirely explained the challenged decision and defendant's claim that nondiscrimination
entirely explained it.
106. Most commentators read DesertPalace as destroying McDonnell Douglas.E.g., Henry
L. Chambers, Jr., The Effect of EliminatingDistinctionsAmong Title VIIDisparateTreatment
Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 102-03 (2004) ("Over time, the formal distinctions among [the
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Initially, commentators viewed this as beneficial to plaintiffs, but at
least three potential downsides exist if Desert Palace becomes the
uniform method for analyzing individual disparate treatment cases.
First, although § 703(m) provides the "motivating factor"
standard for liability, it is connected to the same decision defense in
§ 706(g)(2)(B). On the one hand, a jury finding that defendant
discriminated may be unlikely to believe defendant's proof that it
would have made the same decision even if it had not discriminated;
on the other, a jury may be tempted to "split the baby," which would
substantially limit plaintiffs remedies. Ironically, then, McDonnell
Douglas may survive in cases in which a risk-preferring plaintiff
and a risk-preferring defendant both choose not to invoke Desert
Palaceby not asking for the DesertPalace instruction but rather by
placing all their eggs in the McDonnell Douglas either/or basket. °7
various tests] ... will likely fall with the result that the motivating-factor test will apply to all
disparate treatment cases."); William R. Corbett, An Allegory of the Cave and the Desert
Palace, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1549, 1551-52 (2005) ("[Tjhere is no reason, other than nostalgia, to
keep [McDonnellDouglas]. The more compelling reason to banish it, however, is that because
of its long history of procedural significance, retaining it will cause confusion in cases and
impede recognition of the uniform proof structure that necessarily follows from Desert
Palace."); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing: Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and
IndividualDisparate Treatment Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859, 861 (2004) ("[B]y gobbling
up circumstantial cases, [DesertPalace]hasleft little for McDonnellDouglas."); Jeffrey A. Van
Detta, "Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le Roi!" An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas
and the Transformation of Every Title VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a
"Mixed-Motives" Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 79 (2003) ("[S]ection 703(m) fundamentally
changed the nature of all Title VII disparate treatment litigation;" since "all of the
controversies that McDonnell Douglas and its progeny" generated are gone, and "the quiet
little revolution started in [Desert Palace]will be one of the most significant advances for civil
rights enforcement in the twenty-first century.").
107. Dean Steven Willborn, responding to an earlier version of this Article, questioned
whether a court should instruct the jury contrary to the law, even if the parties did not object.
Letter from Steven Willborn, Dean, Univ. of Neb., Lincoln, to Charles A. Sullivan (on file with
author). Appellate courts are not generally supposed to consider issues not raised before the
court below, and agreement by the parties on a jury instruction therefore would seem to
deprive the courts of any power to review the matter. While there is a "plain error" rule, it
seems largely confined to criminal cases, and some jurisdictions have explicitly rejected any
such rule for civil suits. Barry A. Miller, Sua Sponte Appellate Rulings: When Courts Deprive
Litigants of an Opportunity to Be Heard,39 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1253, 1265 (2002). The critical
question, thus, is likely to be whether the parties can persuade the trial court to give an
instruction that they agree on. Because, by definition, there is not likely to be a viable appeal
on this issue, this is a matter of district court discretion and is likely to depend on a number
of factors, including the presence or absence of pattern jury instructions in the circuit and the
judge's sense of whether giving the instructions sought by both parties will enhance the
prospect of a definitive verdict.
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Second, aside from its effect on proof structures, Desert Palace
may lead to a renewed focus on the meaning of intent. Although the
initial reaction to the case was to look to the adjectives-single vs.
multiple-the decision may put the noun "motive" back on center
stage. If courts define motive to embrace less conscious or even
unconscious impulses and attitudes, the case may offer new
opportunities for cognitive bias scholarship. On the other hand,
conservative courts may seize this opportunity to define motive
in terms of conscious decision making. Thus, Desert Palace
seems to compel a shift from "intent" to "motive," with uncertain
consequences.
Third, the linchpin of DesertPalaceis the undefined and perhaps
incoherent concept of a "motivating factor." Assuming one knows
what "motive" means, when does it sufficiently constitute a
"motivating factor" in an employer's decision? The "same decision"
defense necessarily means that a factor can be a motivating one
even if not the challenged action's but-for cause. But how much less
than but-for can a factor be and still count as motivating? One
possibility is that a motivating factor is one that would appear to
the factfinder to be likely to make a difference in decisions of this
sort (although the defendant may still avoid full remedies if it can
establish that it did not in fact make such a difference)." 8 In any
event, the lower courts have shown agility in avoiding the import of
much clearer terms, and it may be that Desert Palace will founder
on renewed attention to what it means to be a motivating factor.
Even if McDonnell Douglas is doctrinally no longer required,
however, the case law applying it and its progeny will continue to be
of some utility. A court need no longer ask whether the plaintiff has
made out a "prima facie" case, whether the defendant has put into
108. As should be apparent from the discussion above, see supra text beginning at note 73,
the term originated in the plurality opinion in Price Waterhouse, where something might be
a "factor" in a decision even though it made no difference in the actual decision. Of course, the
plurality used the concept essentially for burden shifting and seemed to mean merely that a
factor was motivating when it appeared likely to make a difference in a particular decision,
leaving the defendant the ability to avoid liability by proving that the same decision would
have been made had the factor not been present. But § 703(m) makes a motivating factor a
basis for liability, not merely burden shifting, and therefore is less coherent. Since a
motivating factor can be less than a but-for cause, room for both doctrinal adjustment here
and for restrictive application of the concept, even without formally redefining it, obviously
exists. See generallyMartin J. Katz, The FundamentalIncoherenceof Title VII: Making Sense
of Causationin DisparateTreatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2006).
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evidence a nondiscriminatory reason, nor whether the plaintiff has
sufficient evidence to find the supposed nondiscriminatory reason
to be pretextual. But courts will still have to decide whether
sufficient evidence of a motivating discriminatory reason exists for
a jury to find for the plaintiff. This decision includes whatever
evidence the plaintiff adduces to exclude the applicability of
nondiscriminatory reasons-whether those would have been the
"most common" legitimate reasons that in the past were negated as
part of plaintiffs prima facie case or the more specific reason
articulated in defendant's case. Although a plaintiff will not need to
exclude all potential nondiscriminatory reasons, she will have to
cast sufficient doubt on innocent reasons to allow the jury to find in
her favor by a preponderance of the evidence that an impermissible
reason was a motivating factor.
In practice, one might expect to see courts continuing to use the
McDonnell DouglaslReeves structure as a way of articulating Desert
Palace's more gestalt "sufficient evidence" approach. But a court
that wished to save itself time by granting summary judgment to a
defendant might easily summarize the evidence and conclude that
it was not sufficient for a reasonable jury to find that a discriminatory intent motivated the challenged decision. Such a court nevertheless would be well advised to find "sufficient evidence" in a case
such as Reeves, in which the Supreme Court held that proof of a
prima facie case plus proof of pretext will generally be sufficient at
least to allow the factfinder to decide whether discrimination
occurred.
C. Proving Systemic DisparateTreatment Discrimination
Although most cases and commentary have focused on individual
disparate treatment, its cousin, systemic disparate treatment,
should be mentioned."°9 This theory shares with individual dispa109. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 328, 337-43 (1977)
(upholding a Title VII claim against an employer and union who engaged in a pattern of
discrimination treatment of minority workers). See generally 1 CHARLES A. SULLIVAN,
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: LAW &
PRACTICE §§ 3.01-07 (3d ed. 2002) (distinguishing systematic disparate treatment from
individual disparate treatment and discussing statistical proof of such discrimination and
possible employer defenses).
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rate treatment the requirement of discriminatory intent but is
predicated on yet another proof structure." 0 Put most simply,
systemic disparate treatment allows the factfinder to infer that a
pattern of adverse outcomes resulted from a discriminatory
motivation."' For example, applications from whites and African
Americans go into a hiring office in roughly equal proportions but
whites obtain a much higher proportion of actual hires." 2
Systemic disparate treatment is sometimes confused with
disparate impact because both typically require a showing of
adverse impact on a protected group."13 That is, both theories rest
on the fact that a particular group has fared worse than other
groups in employment success. Disparate impact, however, rests on
the inference that the disparity results from neutral policies that
are both facially neutral and neutral in terms of the intent underlying their adoption." 4 Systemic disparate treatment, by contrast,
rests on the inference that the disparity results from "intentional"
discrimination. 115
Systemic disparate treatment raises three major questions. The
first is whether the data evidencing the plaintiff group's lower
success rates has successfully excluded other factors that explain
the apparent discrepancies, such as nonracial or nongender factors.
For example, the suspicion of intentional discrimination arising
from far fewer blacks being hired from a pool of black and white
applicants is appropriate only if the applicants are roughly equally
qualified.
Even assuming the comparability of the two streams of applicants, disparate treatment presents a second problem because it
requires another inference: that the adverse effects result from an
intent to discriminate. If, for example, the lower success rate of
African Americans is explained by their turning down job offers, a
conclusion that the employer discriminated is unwarranted." 6
110. 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supra note 109, § 3.01.

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. § 4.01.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. In EEOC v. Sears,Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988), the court accepted the
employer's explanation for startling statistical discrepancies in the number of women in better
jobs as compared to their representation in lower-paid positions as resulting from women's
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Third, because systemic disparate treatment is simply a more
generalized version of individual disparate treatment, similar
problems of what constitutes impermissible intent will also arise in
this context. For example, one might infer from data evidencing
lower success rates of African Americans that a hiring office is
knowingly disfavoring blacks, perhaps because of animus or
stereotyped beliefs about black applicants. But another inference is
that hiring office personnel are engaging in unconscious discrimination without being aware that they are applying heuristics that
exclude African Americans. Depending on what counts as the
requisite mental state, a systemic theory may or may not be
established.
D. Summary
Disparate treatment doctrine, whether individual or systemic,
relies ultimately on a finding of intent or motive to discriminate,
and no consensus exists as to what those concepts embrace or,
indeed, whether they are synonymous. Certain core conduct is
clearly prohibited, namely conscious decision making to exclude
members of particular races either because of animus or other
reasons. But the extent to which less conscious influences count is
unclear forty years after Title VII's passage, and equally unclear is
when a trait will be viewed as sufficiently linked to race or sex to
count as race or gender discrimination based on that trait.

lack of interest in the work in question. See id. at 312-13, 319-22; cf. Scott A. Moss, Women
Choosing Diverse Workplaces: A Rational Preference with DisturbingImplications for Both
OccupationalSegregation and Economic Analysis of Law, 27 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 (2004)
(stating that women choosing jobs will prefer nondiscriminatory workplaces and rationally
use diversity as a proxy of them; however, "[wihen a preference for diversity is incorporated
into standard labor-economic analyses, it generates a bleak prediction: women's preferences
for diversity can yield enduring segregation, even in nondiscriminatory workplaces, and even
as more women enter the labor force"). See generally Vicki Schultz, Telling Stories About
Women and Work: JudicialInterpretationof Sex Segregation in the Workplace in Title VII
Cases Raising the Lack of InterestArgument, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (1990) (contending that
courts have failed to recognize the role of employers in shaping women's work aspirations).
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II. THE UNHAPPY PAST AND UNCERTAIN FUTURE
OF DISPARATE TREATMENT

Desert Palace offers a splendid opportunity to reconsider the
whole question of disparate treatment discrimination in an effort to
define the proper role the two theories of liability---disparate
treatment and disparate impact-will play. As discussed above, both
the McDonnellDouglas and Price Waterhouse lines of authority, and
the entire noble experiment of formal proof structures to decide
individual disparate treatment cases, may have come to an end." 7
In what I have described elsewhere as circling back to the
obvious,"' Desert Palace announced that "a plaintiff need only
present sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin was a motivating factor for any employment

practice."'"

9

Whether the "sufficient evidence" approach will result in more
verdicts for victims of racial or gender discrimination is unclear.
Judges who are skeptical about the prevalence of discrimination in
the workplace will continue to act as gatekeepers 2 ° and determine
whether a reasonable jury could find a motivating factor in the case
before them. If the past provides any indication, the answer will
usually be no. Perhaps even more alarming, those plaintiffs who get
past the gatekeeper will meet juries reluctant to find discrimination.
A number of surveys reveal that the disparate treatment theory
is not currently yielding many verdicts for plaintiffs. 2 ' The pattern
117. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
118. Charles A. Sullivan, CirclingBack to the Obvious: The Convergenceof Traditionaland
Reverse Discriminationin Title VII Proof,46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1031, 1031 (2004).
119. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 101 (2003).
120. Judges will make this determination at the summary judgment stage, and when
motions for judgment as a matter of law are made after plaintiffs case in chief is put on, at
the close of all the evidence, and even after a jury verdict for plaintiff. Further, while not a
formal decision point, judges' views about the potential merits of a case are likely to shape
settlement decisions at pretrial settlement conferences.
121. The following studies do not always make clear the theories at stake. However, since
disparate impact claims have always represented a tiny fraction of all discrimination suits,
see John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation, 43 STAN. L. REv. 983, 998 (1991) (estimating that the "disparate
impact doctrine generated only 101 additional cases in 1989," less than 2% of the increase in
judicial caseload as compared to 1970), the data are largely reflective of success of disparate
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of judicial rulings against plaintiffs in dispositive motions is well
documented: commentators have decried the use of summary
judgment to dismiss claims of discrimination for more than a
decade, 122 and recent data confirm this. At one extreme, a new study
shows only a two percent success rate for ADA cases, 123 and
although disability discrimination raises distinct issues, recent
studies focusing on race and sex discrimination cases that go to trial
have painted almost as bleak a picture: one study of traditional race
and sex discrimination verdicts in California reported only about a
sixteen percent plaintiff success rate in discharge cases brought by
non-whites and a thirty-five percent success rate when women
brought discharge cases. 2 4 Given the number of claims dismissed
treatment claims. Certainly, there has been no dramatic upsurge of disparate impact case
filings since the 1991 statute.
122. E.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary Judgment in Hostile Environment
Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 71, 74 (1999) ("[C]ourts increasingly are granting summary
judgment based on the lack of severity or pervasiveness of the harassment."); Vivian Berger,
Employment Mediation in the Twenty-First Century: Challenges in a ChangingEnvironment,
5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 487, 505 (2003) ("Many claims will fail to survive summary
judgment or settle for mere nuisance value. The few suits that do make it to judgment after
trial-approximately five percent or less of the total brought--yield little improvement in
results for workers."); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The
Improper Use of Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 20309 (1993) (examining the declining role of juries in employment discrimination cases as the
use of summary judgment increases and criticizing this trend).
123. A 2003 annual survey by the American Bar Association found that of 304 ADA cases
in the database,
213 resulted in employer wins; 6 in employee wins; and 85 in decisions in which
the merits of the claim were not resolved. Of the 218 [sic] decisions that resolved
the claim (and have not yet been changed on appeal), about 98 percent resulted
in employer wins and 2 percent in employee wins.
Amy L. Allbright, 2003 Employment Decisions Under the ADA Title I-Survey Update, 28
MENTAL & PHYsIcAL DISABIuTY L. REP. 319, 319 (2004). Since 1998, the percentage of
employer wins has fluctuated from a low of 94.4% to a high of 97.3%, with a median of 95.7%.
Id. at tbl.2.
124. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter:An EmpiricalStudy of California
Employment Discriminationand Wrongful DischargeJury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates
for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 517 (2003). The success rates of
plaintiffs in sexual or racial harassment suits was higher. However,
[iln the categories that describe the kind of case that many view as the
quintessential employment discrimination claim, the claim that a woman was
fired because of her sex, or an African American was fired because of his or her
race, plaintiffs won just seven of the twenty-eight cases (25%). And at the
intersection of race and sex, where race and gender were both reported, black
women won only two of the twelve cases tried (17%), including one of the four
termination cases (25%).
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before trial, the antidiscrimination project as a whole may be in
trouble, even if niches exist, such as sexual harassment cases,
where plaintiffs do better.
Of course, the antidiscrimination project's success cannot be
measured solely in terms of favorable verdicts for plaintiffs.
Plaintiffs often are successful in settlement agreements, and
employers may be modifying their structures and practices to avoid
potential liability even if not exposed to a high risk of liability. But
success rates approaching zero are deeply problematic because, over
the long run, they will tend to negatively influence both settlement
outcomes and incentives to reexamine employment structures and
practices.1 25 Admittedly, however, even low plaintiff success rates do
Id. at 544; see also Berger, supra note 122, at 505 ("A recent U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) study revealed that plaintiffs represented by private
attorneys, as opposed to agency lawyers, enjoyed a success rate of merely twenty-seven
percent; on appeal, the figure was sixteen percent."); Kevin M. Clermont, Theodore Eisenberg,
& Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment-DiscriminationPlaintiffsFare in the Federal Courts
of Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. PoL'Y J. 547, 566-67 (2003) ('CThe defendants' reversal rate
stands at 42 percent, while the plaintiffs manage only a 7 percent reversal rate.... The antiplaintiff effect on appeal raises the specter that appellate courts have a double standard for
employment-discrimination cases, harshly scrutinizing employees' victories below while
gazing benignly at employers' victories."); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment DiscriminationPlaintiffsFarein FederalCourt, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429,
454-56 (2004) (concluding that employment discrimination plaintiffs disproportionately lose
at pretrial, trial, and appeal as compared to plaintiffs in other kinds of litigation); Laura Beth
Nielsen & Robert Nelson, Rights Realized?: An Empirical Analysis of Employment
DiscriminationLitigation as a Claiming System, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 603, 665 ('The present
system may police against egregious forms of discrimination, but for many who perceive
themselves to be victims of discrimination their rights remain unrealized."); Michael Selmi,
Why Are Employment DiscriminationCases So Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558 (2001)
("Only about fifteen percent of the claims filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission result in some relief being provided to plaintiffs, a percentage that tends to fall
below other administrative claims. In federal courts, plaintiffs have long suffered success
rates that fall below other civil plaintiffs ...."); Wendy Parker, Lessons in Losing: Race and
National Origin Employment Discrimination Litigation in Federal District Court (Wake
Forest Univ. Legal Studies, Paper No. 05-09, Feb. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=678082 (undertaking an empirical study both of 661 reported race and national
origin cases from across the nation and a case filing study in two districts, and concluding that
such cases are almost impossible to win in federal court).
125. It may be argued that the more meritorious cases are settled prior to trial, but it is
hard to understand why this should occur disproportionately with discrimination cases. See
Selmi, supranote 124, at 560-61 (reporting that employment discrimination cases were much
less successful than insurance cases in his sample, although only slightly less successful than
personal injury cases, whether measured in terms of dispositive pretrial motions, success
rates at jury trial, or success rates at bench trials).
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not establish a problem of discrimination: if discrimination is
uncommon in the United States, one would not anticipate many
successful suits. Indeed, although other factors contribute to low
plaintiff success, a core difficulty is that judges and juries believe
that the antidiscrimination project is not a failure, but a success:
plaintiffs prevail in few cases because judges and juries believe
126
discrimination has largely been eradicated in our society.
Certainly, a declining percentage of the population believes racial
27
discrimination to be a serious national problem.1
Indeed, cognitive bias scholarship may unintentionally validate
this perception. Although it demonstrates that discriminatory
attitudes are pervasive, it does so by accepting the steep decline of
the "old fashioned" discrimination that judges and juries envision.
Indeed, the two views simply do not connect with each other. Judges
and juries seem to think that little discrimination exists, defining
discrimination to be animus or at least conscious decisions, while
the scholars view discrimination as pervasive but largely because
they define it as the natural effects of almost universally held
cognitive biases.
To see this somewhat more clearly, one might try to diagram the
varieties of disparate treatment-ranging from animus motivations,
to rational motivations, to conscious stereotypes, to unconscious
stereotypes. Such a diagram cannot capture other complexities of
disparate treatment law, such as statutory exceptions 2 ' and lower
126. Oppenheimer, supra note 124, at 562-66.
127. See id. at 561-63 (reporting a variety of data from HOWARD SCHUMAN ET AL., RACIAL
ATrITUDES IN AMERICA: TRENDS AND INTERPRETATIONS 156-57 tbl.3.4A (1997) (citing 1996
National Opinion Research Council poll), including that a majority of whites believe that
"[i]nequality between blacks and whites was not the result of discrimination"); see also
Howard Schuman & Maria Krysan, A Historical Note on Whites' Beliefs About Racial
Inequality, 64 AM. SOC. REV. 847, 854 (1999) (documenting "the liberalization of the racial
attitudes of white Americans").
128. For an introduction to coverage limitations, see 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supra
note 109, § 1.06. Even beyond such limitations, the statute contains several textual or courtdevised exceptions from its mandates. Thus, Title VII explicitly permits disparate treatment
(for sex, not race) when such treatment is pursuant to a "bona fide occupational qualification."
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2000); Int'l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 201 (1991) ("The
BFOQ defense is written narrowly, and this Court has read it narrowly."). See generally 1
SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE; supra note 109, § 3.05 (discussing limitations of the BFOQ
defense). Further, there are judicially created exceptions; for example, sex distinctions in
dress and grooming codes are not discrimination within the meaning of the statute. E.g.,
Harper v. Blockbuster Entm't Corp., 139 F.3d 1385, 1387 (11th Cir. 1998) (holding that
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court decisions permitting employers to draw race and sex distinctions when a term or condition of employment is not involved.129 But
Figure 1 does reflect increasingly expansive notions of "intent" or
"motive" to discriminate, growing from the innermost and smallest
circle representing disparate treatment motivated by animus to
increasingly broader definitions that include statistical discrimination, then unconscious cognitive biases and still larger as the
definition embraces workplace dynamics and cultures influenced by
such cognitive biases.

different hair length standards for men and women do not violate Title VII). See generally
Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards,
Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2541 (1994) (criticizing judicial
reliance on community norms); Mary Anne C. Case, DisaggregatingGender from Sex and
Sexual Orientation:The Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence,105 YALE
L.J. 1 (1995) (discussing Title VII and the difference between gender and sex discrimination).
In addition, racial or gender preferences pursuant to a valid affirmative action plan are not
discriminatory. Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616,627-30 (1987); United Steelworkers
of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 200-08 (1979). See generally Sullivan, supra note 118
(discussing disparate treatment discrimination).
129. E.g., Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1243 (11th Cir. 2001) ("A negative
evaluation that otherwise would not be actionable will rarely, if ever, become actionable
merely because the employee comes forward with evidence that his future prospects have
been or will be hindered as a result.'); see Rebecca Hanner White, De Minimis Discrimination,
47 EMORY L.J. 1121, 1148, 1151 (1998) (criticizing these kinds of restrictions); see also Theresa
M. Beiner, Do ReindeerGames Count as Terms, Conditionsor Privilegesof Employment Under
Title VII?, 37 B.C. L. REv. 643, 645-46 (1996) (arguing that benefits such as golf games and
lunches accorded to male employees but not to females, are terms and conditions of
employment); Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 32, at 117 ("As hierarchies flatten,
movement between institutions increases, and the employment relationship is redefined in
terms of individual achievement over hierarchical advancement, employees will find it more
difficult to satisfy [a material adverse action] requirement."); Ernest F. Lidge III, The
Meaningof Discrimination:Why CourtsHave Erredin RequiringEmployment Discrimination
Plaintiffs to Prove that the Employer'sAction Was MateriallyAdverse or Ultimate, 47 U. KAN.
L. REV. 333, 334-35 (1999) (noting that, although the law forbids discrimination in terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, the employee may not be able to recover under these
laws because of the materially adverse requirement).
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Figure 1
Judges and juries, by and large, seem to view discriminatory
intent as occupying the innermost ring, or at most, the inner two
rings; various scholars would increasingly expand the notion of
intent to reach less conscious and more systemic factors. For
example, Professor Krieger calls for expanding disparate treatment
by returning to the statutory text13 ° and focusing on whether
different treatment results because of race or sex. She would
interpret this language to focus on causation, not the causal
mechanism.13 1 Under this view, "because of' might mean animus; it
130. Title VII declares it an unlawful employment practice for an employer, inter alia, "to
fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,
because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(a)(1) (2000) (emphasis added).
131. Krieger, supra note 31, at 1166-67.
[T]o ask whether an employer discriminated against an individual because of
group status is seen as equivalent to asking whether a discriminatory purpose
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might mean a conscious, if not malicious decision; it might mean
unconscious cognitive biases. For such an approach, the critical
point is difference in treatment, not the mechanism that caused the
difference.1 32
Other scholars agree that focusing on causation represents a step
forward but doubt it will be sufficient.'3 3 Taking a more systemic
approach, Professor Tristin Green argues:
motivated the employer's decision. Under this equation of causation and
intentionality, even discrimination that results from applying racial, ethnic, or
gender stereotypes is understood as a product of discriminatory motivation.
Indeed, evidence that a decisionmaker holds stereotypes is relevant in disparate
treatment analysis because it presumedly unmasks discriminatory intent. In the
stories told by disparate treatment caselaw, there is no discrimination without
an invidiously motivated actor. Every successful disparate treatment story needs
a villain.
Id. But from the lens of social cognition theory, this is precisely backwards because
cognitive biases in social judgment operate automatically and must be
controlled, if at all, through subsequent "mental correction." Intergroup
discrimination, or at least that variant which results from cognitive sources of
bias, is automatic. It does not result from a motive or intent to discriminate; it
is an unwelcome byproduct of otherwise adaptive cognitive processes. But, like
many unwanted byproducts, it can be controlled, sometimes even eliminated,
through careful process re-engineering.
Id. at 1216.
Professor Krieger argues for interpreting the Act "as requiring simply that a plaintiff
demonstrate a causal connection between her group status and the employer's decision rather
than as requiring proof of a particular kind of causation, namely specific intent to
discriminate." Id. at 1231.
132. Although Krieger does not acknowledge it, a causation approach brings us very close
to disparate impact-at least in concept, if not precisely as the legal theory has developed
under Title VII. If, say, African Americans are not disadvantaged relative to whites, how could
we ever say that they were being treated differently because of their race? A pure causation
model necessarily is a disparate impact model-not because the causative mechanism might
not be conscious decisions or cognitive bias but because dispensing with intent necessarily
requires a focus on effects.
133. Professor Green, however, doubts that reformulating disparate treatment to focus on
causation, would, standing alone, sufficiently address discrimination in the modern
workplace. Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 32, at 127. Krieger's cognitive approach
tends to reinforce a conception of discrimination as largely individualistic, as
something that derives from individuals in isolation rather than from
individuals in the context of organizational structure, dynamics, and group
more complex, institutionally enabled types of
interaction.... Identification of ...
discrimination requires an openness to structural factors and sensitivity to
patterns of social interaction that cannot be adequately explored under an
individualistic conception of discrimination--even one that includes unconscious
as well as conscious motivation.
Id. at 127-28.
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[R]egulation of some of the more complex, subtle forms of
discrimination common in today's workplace requires a focus on
the operation of discriminatory bias as influenced, enabled, and
even encouraged by the structures, practices, and dynamics of
the organizations and groups within which individuals work....
Conceptualizing a form of discrimination in terms of discriminatory bias in workplace dynamics places much-needed emphasis
on structural factors while making clear that both conscious and
unconscious bias operate at multiple levels of social interaction,
often resulting in decreased opportunity for disfavored groups
without producing a single, identifiable discriminatory decision
or a perceptibly hostile work environment."'
Although a focus on structure might suggest disparate impact,
Professor Green explicitly rejects that as the basis for her proposed
structural approach, 3l 5 arguing instead for an expansion of disparate treatment liability.
Green correctly shifts to a structural focus. As traditionally
conceived, systemic disparate treatment still relies on "motive" or
"intent," but differences in proof of the systemic theory obviate some
of the difficulties with determining what counts as discrimination.
If the factfinder perceives a pattern of exclusion, it may well infer
animus or statistical discrimination when in fact more subtle factors
are at work. Further, the power of statistical proof might lead the
factfinder to infer the requisite intent more readily in a systemic
case than an individual case. That is to say, a pattern of conduct
might seem more compelling proof of underlying bias than would a
single case of unfair treatment of a particular individual. In the
latter situation, the factfinder might more readily infer random
unfairness, as opposed to racism or sexism, than it would when a
stark pattern of race- or gender-slanted results obtains.
134. Id. at 92.
135. Id. at 138.
[D]isparate impact theory is also ill-suited to the task of combating the operation
of discriminatory bias in the modern workplace. This is true at least in part
because disparate impact theory conceptualizes discrimination solely at the
institutional level, neglecting an exploration of the interplay between
institutional choices and the operation of discriminatory bias in individuals and
groups at multiple levels of interaction in the workplace.
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In short, a systemic approach to disparate treatment may solve,
or perhaps "avoid," some of the problems of individual disparate
treatment. Thus, Professor Green's version of structural disparate
treatment would supplement the traditional statistical proof of
racially slanted outcomes that has characterized systemic disparate
treatment cases with evidence that "both conscious and unconscious
13 But
bias operate at multiple levels of social interaction.""
her
theory, precisely because it is pitched on disparate treatment, is
open to the same foundational problem as individual disparate
treatment: if "intent" does not include cognitive mistakes or extend
to characteristics only correlated with the excluded groups, the
employer may still avoid liability, even in a systemic case, by so
persuading the factfinder. 3 v With cognitive biases on center stage,
Green's and other disparate treatment structural theories will stand
or fall on whether the Supreme Court is willing to define "intent" in
terms of cognitive bias.
Indeed, Professor Green's approach poses yet another problem. By
focusing on "decreased opportunity for disfavored groups without...
13 she is
a single, identifiable discriminatory decision,""
seeking not
merely to expand the definition of intent but also to widen current
views of causation. Cognitive bias may be manifested in an atmosphere or series of individually unimportant decisions with cumulatively significant effects rather than in the single decision point." 9
This not only expands "motivating factor" to or beyond any limits
imagined in the cases but also cuts directly against the grain of the
circuits that are increasingly using the notion of "adverse employment action" to declare many employment-related decisions beyond
the reach of Title VII and the other antidiscrimination statutes.14 °
136. Id. at 92.
137. Formally, it is the plaintiff who has the burden of persuasion as to the existence of the
requisite intent in a systemic case as in a case of individual disparate treatment. Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336, 360 (1977). If, however, the plaintiffs
statistical and other proof is sufficiently strong, the employer will have a functional, if not
formal, burden of establishing why such data could exist when no intentional discrimination
was present. Id. at 357-60.
138. Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 32, at 92.
139. Id. at 116 (arguing that, while it might have been appropriate in the early years when
firms were largely hierarchical and bureaucratic, focusing on "blatantly exclusionary
individual decisions made at identifiable points on a hierarchical ladder" has become
increasingly problematic as "governance structures of the workforce shift").
140. See supra note 128.
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One may be skeptical of the success of either altering the
definition of intent or expanding the reach of causation, but if the
recommendations of scholars like Krieger and Green are accepted,
reforming legal doctrine is merely the first step. Both theories
require a new approach to the proof process, which presumably will
begin with the Desert Palace "sufficient evidence" approach. But
how either Krieger or Green would view Desert Palace is unclear.
That decision seems helpful to the extent it abandons more
structured methods of proof for a holistic assessment of the evidence
in question, and therefore opens the way for more flexible proof.
But both scholars should recognize that Desert Palace may not
assist plaintiffs because its reformulation does not eliminate the
underlying problem of when to infer discriminatory intent: it merely
submerges it in the broader question of whether a case gets to the
jury or whether a jury verdict for plaintiff will stand when a
motion for judgment as a matter of law is made after the verdict is
rendered.
Put another way, in an individual case, the courts will still have
to decide whether a plaintiffs disproof of defendant's asserted
nondiscriminatory reasons is sufficient, together with other
evidence, to support a jury verdict for her. And in a systemic case,
the court will have to determine whether employment structures
enabled discriminatory bias or whether nondiscriminatory possibilities, such as women's lack of interest or job commitment 4 ' are
better explanations. The reality will remain that judges' perceptions
about the relative likelihood of discrimination will determine what
cases get to the jury in the first place and what jury verdicts will be
allowed to stand. And jury perceptions about the likelihood of
discrimination, as opposed to an infinite range of other human
motivations and influences, will determine the verdicts in those
cases they do decide. This means that the new dispensation of
"sufficient evidence" is less a panacea than an admission of failure
of the proof structure system to come to grips with the fundamental
problem.
And, of course, that fundamental problem is the viability of
Professor Calloway's "basic assumption." At the least, to shift the
present center of gravity towards that assumption, plaintiffs must
141. See infra note 147.
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introduce evidence in disparate treatment cases about the prevalence of discrimination. Perhaps the most obvious use of such
testimony is to remind or convince the jury that discrimination is
still prevalent (at least given the particular employment context)
and therefore, to convince jurors that discrimination in the case at
hand is more likely than they might at first believe. More dramatically, the new cognitive bias scholarship suggests that plaintiffs
must go much further to explain why discrimination is both
prevalent and largely invisible. That is, they must deploy expert
testimony to educate the jury about the continued operation of race
animus, consciously held stereotypes, the more subtle operation
results of racially slanted cognitive biases, and/or the effect of
workplace dynamics and cultures in enabling these biases.
In short, whether Krieger's or Green's approach is followed,
experts will not only need to remind or convince the factfinder that
discrimination is still prevalent, but will also need to educate the
factfinder that social science research suggests that all of
us-judges and jurors included-may be biased without knowing it.
If Professor Green's theory is adopted, experts will also have to
testify about how such biases are enabled by workplace structures
and that this is likely to happen without manifesting itself in any
particular employment decision. Without such testimony, a jury
might erroneously believe that a woman and/or minority would not
be more likely than their white male counterparts to be disadvantaged in a particular employment context. Without such proof, the
sufficient evidence test may result in outcomes as bad as or worse
142
than those decried under the McDonnell Douglas proof structure.
One may be skeptical about the success of this enterprise on its
own terms. Convincing a jury that everyone, including themselves,
is prejudiced does not seem psychologically plausible in light of the
deep commitment to egalitarian values that our society now
embraces. But, even putting this foundational objection aside, the
use of experts has its problems. The revolution in expert evidence
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.'4 3 triggered is
beginning to manifest itself in the employment arena. 4 4 One recent
142. See Selmi, supra note 124.
143. 509 U.S. 579, 589-97 (1993).
144. Experts are typically used in employment discrimination cases for proof of damages,
e.g., Tesser v. Bd. of Educ., 370 F.3d 314, 317-20 (2d Cir. 2004), and, where systemic claims
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case overturned a jury verdict because the trial judge failed to make
a Daubertdetermination on the record concerning plaintiffs witness
who brought "specialized sociological knowledge ... of contempo6rary
racism" into the courtroom. 145 Although not formally addressing the
testimony's admissibility, the court's action may well have revealed
hostility to this expertise. 4 6 More generally, plaintiffs will have to
establish both the disciplines at issue and the expertise of particular
experts in those disciplines in the crucible of litigation. And, of
course, one can anticipate employers presenting their own experts
and the ensuing battle
of experts, which has not always restilted in
1 47
success for plaintiffs.

are made, to show statistical correlations, e.g., Adams v. Ameritech Servs., Inc., 231 F.3d 414,
422-28 (7th Cir. 2000). Use of experts in stereotyping and cognitive deficiencies is
comparatively new, although Price Waterhouse itself involved such an expert. See generally
Martha Chamallas, Listening to Dr.Fiske: The Easy Case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 15
VT. L. REV. 89 (1990) (discussing several Justices' displeasure with an expert witness's
testimony based on social psychology research).
145. Elsayed Mukhtar v. Cal. State Univ., Hayward, 299 F.3d 1053, 1063-66 & n.9 (9th Cir.
2002) amended by 319 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2003); see also Ray v. Miller Meester Adver. Inc.,
664 N.W.2d 355, 365-66 (Minn. App. 2003) (holding that it was an abuse of discretion to admit
a professor's testimony on gender stereotyping because "virtually all adults in our society
know about gender stereotypes"). But see Peter H. Wingate & George C. Thornton III,
Industrial/Organizational
Psychology and the FederalJudiciary:Expert Witness Testimony
and the Daubert Standards,28 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 97, 105-07, 109-10 (2004) (reporting a
survey that revealed that federal judges are "relatively unfamiliar" with industrial/
organizational psychology but nevertheless "moderately likely" to admit expert testimony in
age discrimination cases).
146. See Deborah Dyson, Comment, Expert Testimony and "Subtle Discrimination"in the
Workplace: Do We Now Need a Weatherman to Know Which Way the Wind Blows?, 34 GOLDEN
GATE U. L. REV. 37, 53-54 (2004) (finding that, although the court in Elsayed Mukhtar did not
pass directly on the merits of the expert, the lower court's admission of his testimony was
harmful error only if the testimony was inadmissible); see also John V. Jansonius & Andrew
M. Gould, Expert Witnesses in Employment Litigation: The Role of Reliability in Assessing
Admissibility, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 267, 317-25 (1998) (discussing the implications of Daubert).
147. Perhaps the most famous case where expertise ricocheted against plaintiffs is EEOC
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 839 F.2d 302 (7th Cir. 1988). See generally Thomas Haskell &
Sanford Levinson, Academic Freedom and Expert Witnessing: Historiansand the Sears Case,
66 TEX. L. REv. 1629 (1988) (describing the academic controversy arising from a feminist's role
as an expert witness for Sears in a sex discrimination case). Sears successfully split a seam
within feminist thinking by looking to "difference feminism" to bulwark its argument that
apparently damning statistics about the absence of women in its higher-paid sales jobs was
caused by its female employees' lack of interest in these positions. See Schultz, supra note
116, at 1752-53.
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III. THE DISPARATE IMPACT ALTERNATIVE

A. Brief Overview
A short history of the disparate impact theory of discrimination
begins with its creation in 1971 in the Title VII case of Griggs v.
Duke Power Co.14 Its birth was scarcely auspicious because many
viewed the theory as a transparent device to end-run a dubious
lower court fact-finding of no intentional discrimination in the
waning days of the Old South. Although the theory prospered for a
time in Title VII cases, the Court soon disavowed the theory for
discrimination cases brought under the Equal Protection Clause149
or under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and in 1989 the Court finally eviscerated
the theory even under Title VII in Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio. 5 °
The story has a happy resolution, however, with Congress riding
to the rescue. After failing in 1990 by one vote to override the first
President Bush's veto of an act whose centerpiece was restoration
of disparate impact, Congress and the President reached an
agreement on the Civil Rights Act of 1991.151 That statute amended
Title VII to explicitly codify for the first time disparate impact as an
unlawful employment practice and thus reinstate the theory to its
rightful place as a centerpiece of the antidiscrimination project. As
a final touch of irony, the coincidental birth of the Griggs theory in
1971 was matched by a deus ex machina in 1991-the Anita
148. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See generally Charles A. Sullivan, The World Turned Upside
Down?: DisparateImpact Claims by White Males, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1505 (2004) (discussing
the history of Griggs and disparate impact theory).
149. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-42 (1976).
150. 490 U.S. 642, 656-60 (1989).
151. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991). See generallyAlfred W. Blumrosen, Society

in Transition IV-Affirmation of Affirmative Action Under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 45
RUTGERs L. REV. 903 (1993) (arguing that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 was a repudiation of
the Reagan-Bush policy of limiting equal employment laws to the prevention of intentional

discrimination); Roger Clegg, Introduction:A BriefLegislative History of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 54 LA. L. REV. 1459 (1994) (recounting the history of the statute's enactment); Neal
Devins, Reagan Redux: Civil Rights Under Bush, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 955 (1993)
(discussing the first President Bush's negotiations over the Civil Rights Act of 1991); Douglas

W. Kmiec, Forward:The 1991 Civil Rights Act: A Constitutional,Statutory,and Philosophical
Enigma, 68 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 911 (1993) (discussing the inherent difficulties of
implementing the Civil Rights Act of 1991).
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impelling
Hill/Clarence Thomas confrontation that many credit as 152
the Bush administration to compromise on the 1991 Act.
Somewhat surprisingly, the tale largely ends here. Given the twoyear national debate about civil rights that generated enormous
controversy in the national media and inside the Beltway, one might
have expected an explosion of disparate impact cases after 1991. To
the contrary, little development has occurred5 4on this front, either in
53
the Supreme Court or at the circuit level.
B. From Griggs to the 1991 Civil Rights Act
Disparate impact has always been counterintuitive 5 5 because it
targets equal treatment, not merely different treatment, as
discriminatory and does not require any racial motivation. At base,
it defines "discrimination" differently than the term is normally
used. Confusion over the theory has arisen more from this fact than
from questions about how one proves that a challenged practice has
a disparate impact.' 56
After describing disparate treatment as "the most easily
understood" form of discrimination, the Court in International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, went on to contrast it
with disparate impact:

152. Linda S. Greene, "BreakingForm," 44 STAN. L. REV. 909, 918 (1992) (reviewing
PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS (1991))
But for the "fortuity" of Nina Totenberg's Anita Hill revelations, the bill would
have remained mired in Congress. It was unstuck for equally image-laden
reasons: the political fallout resulting from a temporarily more powerful image
of women, sisters, daughters, mothers, and wives forced to endure sexual
harassment in order to retain their jobs.
Id.
153. Disparate impact has reached the Supreme Court only in cases involving statutes
other than Title VII. The first case involved the operation of the theory under the Americans
with Disabilities Act. See Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44, 46 (2003). The second
encounter resolved the long-simmering question of the viability of the theory under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act. See infra note 260.
154. See infra text accompanying note 233.
155. Fiss, supra note 20, at 299 (questioning why practices which we would now describe
as disparate impact should be viewed as race discrimination within the meaning of the
antidiscrimination laws when they are at most the functional equivalent of intentional racial
discrimination).
156. See infra text accompanying note 263.
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Claims of disparate treatment may be distinguished from claims
that stress "disparate impact." The latter involve employment
practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different
groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than
another and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of
discriminatory motive, we
have held, is not required under a
15 7
disparate-impact theory.
Disparate impact emerged in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.'58
The facts of the case and the Court's approach to them demonstrate
the theory in operation, but also may explain why the theory has not
been widely deployed. Prior to Title VII, Duke Power had operated
a facially discriminatory system of job segregation: black employees
were restricted to the labor department, one of five departments in
a power station. All employees entering the other departments were
required to have high school diplomas, although African Americans
entering the labor department were not. On the effective date of
Title VII in 1965, the diploma requirement was extended to the
labor department, and all individuals entering the formerly allwhite departments were also required to pass two short-form,
standardized tests. These prerequisites to positions in the formerly
all-white departments operated to keep most present and future
black employees concentrated in the labor department.
Neither the district court nor the Fourth Circuit found any
intentional discrimination in the company's adoption of the test and
diploma prerequisites. The district court found them rational
management techniques for securing the best-qualified employees.
The Fourth Circuit held that the requirements had been adopted for
the legitimate business purpose of improving the general quality of
employees and without an intention to discriminate against blacks.
Thus, the lower courts upheld the test and diploma requirements
despite any showing that a high school degree and scoring well on
157. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36 n.15 (1977) (citations
omitted). The Teamsters' scheme suggests that a combination of disparate treatment and
disparate impact marks out all of the space needed to deal with discrimination: "Either theory
may, of course, be applied to a particular set of facts." Id. That is to say, any actionable
employment practice or decision would seem to be challengeable under one or both theories.
The suggestion may be that the converse is also true: if an action does not constitute disparate
impact or disparate treatment, it does not violate the statute.
158. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the tests were related to good job performance. The Supreme Court
disagreed, striking down the challenged test and diploma requirements and thereby establishing the rationale and fundamental
structure of disparate impact discrimination.
According to the Court, Congress's objective in enacting Title VII
was to
achieve equality of employment opportunities and remove
barriers that have operated in the past to favor an identifiable
group of white employees over other employees. Under the Act,
practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even
neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate
to "freeze" the status quo of prior discriminatory employment
practices.... The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but
also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be
to be related to job performance, the practice is prohibshown
159
ited.
Applying this analysis, the Court found that the tests and the
high school diploma requirement had a substantially greater impact
on blacks than whites. Only twelve percent of blacks in North
Carolina had high school diplomas, while thirty-four percent of
whites had finished high school. Further, the challenged tests had
a disparate impact on blacks because fifty-eight percent of whites
passed the test nationally compared with only six percent of
blacks. 6 ° These statistics were sufficient to establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact discrimination. The defendant's intent to
discriminate was not an element of the prima facie case and, given
the undisturbed findings below, could hardly be relevant.161
But a determination of disparate impact did not automatically
result in liability. Instead, the Court held that an employer would
159. Id. at 429-31.
160. Id. at 430 n.6. These statistics were not focused on Duke Power's workforce or
recruiting area.
161. Given the institution of the new requirements just as Title VII became effective, in a
plant with a history of de jure discrimination, the Court may have been suspicious about the
findings of the district court. As it would later announce in Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470
U.S. 564, 580 (1985), it was, nevertheless, bound by those findings under the clearly erroneous
rule.
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be permitted to justify its use of the challenged criteria, notwithstanding their impact. The employer's defense was formulated
differently at different points in the opinion. Although the Court
was not specific as to what would suffice, it was clear as to what
would not: "[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does
not redeem employment procedures" with a disparate impact
because "Congress directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences
of employment practices, not simply the motivation."' 62 As to what
would "redeem" such practices, Griggssometimes spoke of justifying
the challenged requirements as a "business necessity" and some1 3 The Court tended to treat both
times as being "job related.""
formulations as synonymous, although they are linguistically
different. In the case itself, "job relation" was the key: Duke Power
had not established the defense because "neither the high school
completion requirement nor the general intelligence test is shown
to bear a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the
jobs for which it was used."'6 4 Although the testing and diploma
requirements had been adopted to generally improve the workforce's
qualifications, Duke Power could not show that they were related to
the performance of particular jobs at the plant.6 5
162. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
163. Id. at 431 ("The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice which
operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be related to job performance, the practice
is prohibited."). The discussion of "job relation" occurs in connection with the EEOC's
regulations concerning tests, which required that a "professionally developed ability test" be
one "which fairly measures the knowledge or skills required by the particular job or class of
jobs which the applicant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to measure the
applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs." Id. at 433 n.9 (quoting the
EEOC Guidelines on Employment Testing Procedures).
164. Id. at 431.
165. Id. at 431-32. In addition to the job-related/business necessity defense, Title VII
includes several statutory defenses to a disparate impact case. Section 703(h) specifies that
it is not unlawful "for an employer to apply different standards of compensation, or different
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" when it acts pursuant to a bona fide seniority,
merit, or incentive system, so long as any differences "are not the result of an intention to
discriminate." Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(h), 78 Stat. 241, 257 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(2000)). The provision also permits "an employer
to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed ability test," again provided
the test "is not designed, intended or used to discriminate." Id. The Court has viewed the
testing defense as an affirmative one: an employer must prove that its use of an employment
test with a disparate impact has been validated in order to establish the defense. See
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425, 436 (1975) (noting that tests are authorized
in limited circumstances, pending new validation efforts). In contrast, the seniority cases have
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Although the stringency of the business-necessity/job-relation
justification has been a matter of debate, Griggs was potentially a
very radical opinion. Duke Power's policies were rationally ielated
to its permissible goal of increased productivity: had this been a
constitutional challenge to a public employer's use of such criteria,
they would have passed with flying colors. Further, Duke Power was
scarcely outside of the mainstream since many large employers used
similar tests to select their workforces. Finally, the notion that
better education might conduce to more efficiency in an increasingly
complex world is scarcely counterintuitive in a society that tends to
believe more is better when it comes to education. Nevertheless,
Griggs demanded that, where the requisite disparate impact exists,
some proof must also exist that the employer was not merely
reasonable but also right in its policies."6
The Court's subsequent decisions developed this theory. For
example, Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody 6 ' set forth a three-step
litigation structure, with plaintiff having the initial burden of
establishing a prima facie case of impact and the defendant then
having the burden of proving that a business necessity and/or jobrelated reason justified the practice. Even if the defendant carries
his burden, liability could still be imposed if the plaintiff could
prove that another practice, with less impact, could satisfy the

held that disparate impact is not available to challenge a seniority system; such practices can
only be challenged under disparate treatment. E.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324, 353-54 (1977) ("[A]n otherwise neutral, legitimate seniority system does not
become unlawful under Title VII simply because it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination.").
In addition, while § 703 as amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act recognizes disparate
impact liability, it explicitly exempts from disparate impact challenges "a rule barring the
employment of an individual who currently and knowingly uses or possesses a controlled
substance." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(3) (2000). Further, § 712 provides a defense to challenges
to state veterans' preference laws, which might otherwise be susceptible to disparate impact
attack. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 11 (2000). See generally 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supranote
109, §§ 4.04-08.
166. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431-32 (noting that the record indicated that those employees
hired before the high school diploma and test requirements were imposed had performed
satisfactorily and had made progress in the departments where those requirements had
subsequently been imposed, thus debunking the notion that the requirements were
necessary).
167. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
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168 As discussed below, this structure
employer's business needs.
169
came under attack later.
In Dothard v. Rawlinson,7 ° the employer's height and weight
minima for prison guards eliminated most women from consideration, creating a barrier to women's employment opportunities that
the Court held could be addressed through disparate impact.'7 1
Dothardis significant because it cut disparate impact free from any
necessity that the disparity's cause be traced either to de jure or
more general societal discrimination, neither of which caused the
exclusion of women in that case. And in Connecticut v. Teal,'72 the
Court emphasized that the very existence of a barrier to employment opportunities justified the use of disparate impact analysis:
that minorities as a group were not excluded from the jobs in
question was not a defense to a disparate impact claim if minorities
were disproportionately excluded from the opportunity to compete
for the jobs. 7 '
This approach to disparate impact analysis stayed more or less
intact until 1988. In Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 74 the
Court continued the expansive interpretation given disparate
impact analysis by holding unanimously that it applied to subjective

168. Id. at 425.
169. See infra text accompanying notes 178-82.
170. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
171. Id. at 329, 330; see also Ramona Paetzold & Steven L. Willborn, Deconstructing
DisparateImpact: A View of the Model Through New Lenses, 74 N.C. L. REV. 325, 353-54
(1996).
Ordinary disparate impact cases, then, view causation with blinders. The law
treats the employer's criterion as the cause of a disparity, even though it may be
only one of a wide array of factors necessary to produce the disparity.... The
blinders necessarily mean that employers may be held legally responsible for
impacts that are "caused" in substantial part by factors external to the
employers.

Id.
172. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
173. Id. at 448.
When an employer uses a non-job-related barrier in order to deny a minority or
woman applicant employment or promotion, and that barrier has a significant
adverse effect on minorities or women, then the applicant has been deprived of
an employment opportunity"because of ... race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
Id.
174. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).
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elements of an employer's selection procedures.'7 5 However, a
plurality sought a substantially narrower view of the theory 176 that
foreshadowed the following year's decision in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio,177 in which
a majority of the Court radically restruc78
doctrine.'
the
tured
In terms of its holding, Wards Cove addressed merely how a
plaintiff proved a prima facie case by requiring the plaintiff to
identify the qualified labor pool 7'9 and the specific practice that
caused the impact. 80 To this point, Wards Cove refined, not
redefined, disparate impact. But the Court went on to make
major changes in disparate impact analysis. First, the majority
determined that a burden of production, not persuasion, passed
to the defendant once the plaintiff established a prima facie case
of disparate impact. 18' Second, the Court redefined business
necessity by taking out "necessity" and replacing it with the notion
of reasonable employer justification.'8 2
175. Id. at 991. The unanimous Court agreed with Justice O'Connor that "subjective or
discretionary employment practices may be analyzed under the disparate impact approach
in appropriate cases." Id.
176. Id. at 987 (linking the disparate treatment and impact theories, Justice O'Connor
stated that "the necessary premise of the disparate impact approach is that some employment
practices, adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in operation be
functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination").
177. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
178. Some commentators dispute that Wards Cove was really such a radical change. See
Kingsley R. Browne, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: A "Quota Bill,"A Codificationof Griggs, A
PartialReturn to Wards Cove, or All of the Above?, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 287, 290 (1993)
(arguing that "the Wards Cove opinion made only marginal adjustments to the disparateimpact doctrine"). But the legislative history of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is replete with
attacks on Wards Cove as marking a substantial departure from prior law. See Sullivan, supra
note 148, at 1535-42 (recounting the legislative history of the 1991 Amendments).
179. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 652-54.
180. Id. at 657.
[A] Title VII plaintiff does not make out a case of disparate impact simply by
showing that, "at the bottom line," there is racial imbalance in the work force.
As a general matter, a plaintiff must demonstrate that it is the application of a
specific or particular employment practice that has created the disparate impact
under attack.
Id.
181. Id. at 644 ("To the extent that some of this Court's decisions speak of an employer's
'burden of proof with respect to the business justification defense, they should be understood
to mean an employer's burden of production, not persuasion.").
182. Id. at 659 (noting that rather than requiring the defendant to establish a business
necessity for the challenged practice, the employer need only present evidence that the
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In reaction to Wards Cove and other decisions issued during the
1988 Term of the Supreme Court, Congress passed, and President
Bush signed, the Civil Rights Act of 1991.183 Declaring that Wards
Cove had "weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil
rights protections," Congress codified the disparate impact theory
although it made some adjustments in the process." 4 Section 703
was amended by the addition of a new subsection (k), which
declared disparate impact discrimination an "unlawful employment
practice."'85 Congress, however, provided that disparate impact
claims are to be tried to the court, and also declared that compensatory and punitive damages were unavailable in disparate impact
cases. 6 Under disparate impact then, the available relief is
backpay, 8 7 an injunction requiring the practice to be eliminated,"s
and attorneys' fees.'8 9
In codifying disparate impact, Congress both accepted and rejected portions of Wards Cove. Section 703(k)(1) requires a plaintiff
to identify, as part of the prima facie case, "a particular employment
practice" causing a disparate impact. 9 ° However, it provides an
escape hatch from this requirement: if the plaintiff can demonstrate that "the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking
process are not capable of separation for analysis, the decisionmaking process may be analyzed as one employment practice,"'' a

practice "serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of the employer").
183. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981).
184. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 2, 105 Stat. at 1071.
185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2000).
186. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
187. 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supra note 109, § 13.09.
188. Id. § 13.07.
189. Id. § 13.15.
190. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B) (2000).
191. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(I) (2000). Where the plaintiff cannot separate the
components of the employer's process for analysis, and proves disparate impact from the
entire process, the defendant need not justify any part of the process that it can establish not
to have an impact. "Ifthe respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice does
not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate that such
practice is required by business necessity." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(ii) (2000). The word
"demonstrate" seems to require this to be viewed as an affirmative defense, but that would
seem to place the burden of persuasion on both parties-the plaintiff must demonstrate that
a process cannot be separated for analysis but the defendant may demonstrate that part of
it can be so separated.
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potentially important provision.192 Thus, the statute essentially
codifies Wards Cove's determination that impact claims generally
may not be based on the "bottom line" results of an employer's
hiring practices; rather, if possible, the plaintiff must identify the
practices she claims are causing the impact.19 3
The 1991 amendments squarely rejected other aspects of Wards
Cove, however. Once a plaintiff establishes disparate impact, she
prevails if "the respondent fails to demonstrate that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity."' 9 4 There are at least two significant
192. One might have thought this was implicit in Wards Cove, but the Court in Smith v.
City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005), did not suggest any such limitation to the Wards Cove
approach, which continues to control in cases brought under ihe Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. See discussion infra note 260 (comparing the Court's holding in Smith v.
City of Jackson with Wards Cove as it applies to the ADEA).
193. The Interpretive Memorandum, which is the "official" legislative history of the Act in
this regard, § 105(b) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981), addresses when components are capable of being
separated for analysis: "When a decision-making process includes particular, functionallyintegrated practices which are components of the same criterion, standard, method of
administration, or test, such as the height and weight requirements designed to measure
strength in Dothard v. Rawlinson, the particular, functionally-integrated practices may be
analyzed as one employment practice." 137 CONG. REC. 28680 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991)
(Interpretative Memorandum) (citation omitted); see Paetzold & Willborn, supra note 171, at
378-79 (questioning whether the Interpretive Memorandum does much more than "prevent
the absurdity of having the plaintiff separate each employment-related test item for disparate
impact analysis, because test items are viewed as components of the same test"); see also
Steven R. Greenberger, A ProductivityApproach to DisparateImpact and the Civil Rights Act
of 1991, 72 OR. L. REv. 253, 292-95 (1993) (detailing the legislative history of this provision).
194. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2000). See generally Susan S. Grover, The Business
Necessity Defense in DisparateImpact DiscriminationCases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 430 (1996)
(arguing that "an employer must prove that the goal it seeks to achieve through the practice
is crucial to its continued viability and, in turn, that the practice selected is crucial to the
achievement of that goal"); Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense
to the DisparateImpact Cause of Action: Findingthe Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479, 1485
(1996).
[Tihe only way to fulfill both of the objectives of Title VII-the removal of
artificial barriers to employment and the preservation of the legitimate
prerogatives of the employer-is to interpret the amended Title VII as
establishing different standards for different types of jobs. A more flexible
standard of business necessity should be applied to qualifications for positions
that, because of their difficulty, great responsibility, or special risks to the
public, require skills or intangible qualities that cannot be measured
empirically. In the vast majority of jobs where such qualifications are not
necessary, the stricter standards of necessity should apply.
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aspects to this language. First, the statute specifies that a burden
of persuasion, not merely production, shifts to the defendant once
plaintiff proves impact.1 95 The statute thus rejected Wards Cove's
dicta that the burden of persuasion does not shift from the plaintiff.
Second, in describing what the defendant must show to carry its
burden of persuasion, Congress used the terms "job related" and
"business necessity." By using these terms from Griggs, not the
watered-down language from Wards Cove, Congress clearly revived
the requirement of a close fit between the challenged practice and
the employer's justification for using that practice.1 96 Perhaps
significantly, Congress used the terms conjunctively, thus suggesting that both job relation and business necessity were required.
Congress, however, declined to define those terms. Instead, the
statute explicitly referred to an "Interpretive Memorandum" which
was to serve as the exclusive source of legislative history when
construing the statute. 197 That Interpretive Memorandum states
laconically that "the terms 'business necessity' and 'job related' are
intended to reflect the concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and in the other Supreme Court
decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio."' 98 Because the
Court's pre-Wards Cove decisions send conflicting signals, this
statement offers little guidance, leaving the scope of the defendant's
burden open to question.
The 1991 Civil Rights Act also defined an "alternative employment practices" surrebutal for plaintiffs. Although the possibility of
a plaintiff responding to an employer's proof of business necessity
by adducing evidence of a less discriminatory alternative can be
traced back to Albemarle, 99 the 1991 amendments codified the
possibility for the first time. The statute now provides that a
195. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(m) (2000) (defining "demonstrates" as "meet[ing] the burdens of
production and persuasion').
196. Although the terms 'job related" and "business necessity" were found in Griggs, the
consistent with business
statutory language "job-related for the position in question and ...
necessity" was borrowed from the Americans with Disabilities Act, which had been enacted
in 1990. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(6) (2000).
197. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(b), Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075 (1991)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 note (2000) (Legislative History for 1991
Amendment)).
198. 137 CONG. REC. 28680 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) (Interpretive Memorandum) (citations
omitted).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 167-68.
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plaintiff may prevail in a disparate impact case by identifying an
alternative employment practice that the defendant refuses to
adopt. The meaning of this provision is unclear. 0 0 Congress did not
define "alternative employment practice" but instead said the law
existing immediately before the Wards Cove decision should define
the concept.2 ' However, Wards Cove first introduced the term
"alternative employment practice,"20 2 although there are precursors
in Albemarle's reference to "other tests or selection devices without
a similarly undesirable racial effect."2 ' Compounding this interpretive problem is the question of what it means for an employer to
"refuse" to adopt such an alternative. The suggestion might be that
the employer is not liable unless it has considered the possibility
and rejected it. Thus, precisely what a plaintiff must show to win a
disparate impact claim using this route is unclear.
In sum, disparate impact theory remains a complicated and
confusing doctrine. 0 4 The statutory language is ambiguous on many
points, and the lower courts have developed refinements to the
doctrine, which will be explored later in this Article.20 5
Further, the rationale underpinning disparate impact theory has
never been fully developed.20 6 Indeed, a wide range of theoretical
justifications exist that have more or less support in the cases. One
obvious possibility, given Griggs's... factual context, is that disparate impact is merely a technique to reach defendants who are
acting with discriminatory intent when proof sufficient to establish
a disparate treatment case is lacking. The plurality opinion in
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust °8 may have embraced this view
when it described disparate impact as being the "functional equiva-

200. See Michael J. Zimmer, Individual DisparateImpact Law: On the Plain Meaning of
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 LOy. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 473 (1999).
201. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(C) (2000).
202. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 660-61 (1989).
203. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975).
204. See Greenberger, supra note 193, at 292 ("On the whole, it is fair to say that, to a
significant degree, the Act leaves disparate impact law in the state of confusion in which it
has existed since its inception.").
205. See infra text accompanying note 234.
206. Alfred W. Blumrosen attempted the first extended academic justification. See supra
note 26.
207. See supra note 158.
208. 487 U.S. 977 (1988).

2005]

DISPARATE IMPACT

965

lent" of intentional discrimination. °s Wards Cove also seemed based
on this premise.2 1 ° From a realist perspective, this is an appealing
explanation of the theory's invention because it is scarcely the first
time a court avoided "bad facts" by altering the law. Under this
view, disparate impact theory would permit liability to be imposed
in cases in which proof of intent is lacking but in which a. strong
suspicion of discriminatory intent exists. The problem, of course, is
that this perspective does not offer any real constraints on the
theory. After all, the courts could scarcely invoke disparate impact
only when they suspected that a trial court's or jury's findings on
the intent issue were incorrect.
A second rationale for disparate impact emerges from the Griggs
Court's reference to racial segregation in North Carolina, where
Duke Power was located: "Basic intelligence must have the means
of articulation to manifest itself fairly in a testing process. Because
they are Negroes, petitioners have long received inferior education
in segregated schools ...21 Such a view would justify and possibly
limit disparate impact to those settings where prior de jure
discrimination made it not "fair" to use a particular criterion.
Although this seems like a particularly compelling justification for
the theory, Dothard v. Rawlinson 12 established that the disparate
impact was not confined to de jure segregation, 1 ' nor was it limited
to racial discrimination.2 1 4
A somewhat more expansive version of this justification would
look not to de jure discrimination that hampered the disfavored
group from satisfying the particular criterion at issue, as in Griggs,
but rather would look to a history of discrimination and subordina-

209. Id. at 987.
210. The Court did not use the term "functional equivalent" when it reformulated business
necessity as a burden of production, not persuasion, but its reformulation was in part because
such a rule "conforms to the rule in disparate-treatment cases that the plaintiff bears the
burden of disproving an employer's assertion that the adverse employment action or practice
was based solely on a legitimate neutral consideration." Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642,660 (1989). This equation of disparate impact and treatment suggests adherence

to the "functional equivalent" view.
211. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971).
212. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
213. For example, see Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) and New York City Transit

Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568 (1979), both of which arose in the Northeast.
214. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 328-29 (applying the theory to sex discrimination).
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tion of the group in question.21 5 Thus, in Dothard v. Rawlinson no
reason existed to believe that women's shorter stature and lower
weight as compared to men were the result of de jure or even de
facto societal discrimination. Nevertheless, women had a long
history of legal and societal subordination in this country, which
might 16justify removing unnecessary barriers to their advancement.
This suggests a final, even broader view of disparate impact
-eliminating unnecessary obstacles to human advancement,
without regard to whether the beneficiaries of such a policy have
been victimized by discrimination. After all, an egalitarian society
might well decide that obstacles to employment should be limited to
those that are demonstrably conducive to employer productivity.
The obvious problem with this sweeping approach is that it is
completely untethered to the prohibition of discrimination that
underlies Title VII. At its broadest, disparate impact would
eliminate unnecessary obstacles only when they have disproportionate effects on racial groups or one of the sexes.2" 7
But perhaps identifying a rationale is unnecessary: Congress is
empowered to adopt rules of law and is not constrained by any
requirement of theoretic consistency."' The new statute's formulation of disparate impact seems to cut it loose from whatever
moorings it may have had as a means to address intentional, if

215. Julia Lamber, DiscretionaryDecisionmaking:The Application of Title VII's Disparate
Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILL. L. REv. 869, 903.
The most straightforward argument favoring the disparate impact theory is that
in Title VII Congress imposed a responsibility on employers to heed
disproportionate outcomes for blacks and women, even when equal treatment
causes these outcomes. This duty is based on a recognition that historical, social,
and structural barriers can impede the achievement of minority group members.

Id.
216. Professor Lamber writes, "The most extreme view of the disparate impact definition
is that its function is to ensure equal achievement for minority group members. This view
recognizes a group right to a proportionate share of the economic pie." Id. This view is
extreme because, even in its most robust form, disparate impact will not guarantee such
outcomes.
217. See Sullivan, supra note 148, at 1506 (discussing whether males and whites can
invoke the theory).
218. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act is one of the antitrust laws, even though it is
almost universally viewed as anticompetitive. See generallyROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST
PARADOX 382-401 (1978).
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concealed, discriminatory motive.21 Whether or not the impact
theory is justified in whole or in part by the difficulty of proving the
intent of "discreet discriminators," the theory stands on its own as
a basis for liability. Congress's decision in 1991 to codify disparate
impact and to distinguish impact claims from treatment claims in
both the burdens of production and proof and in the remedies
available means that disparate impact is not merely a surrogate
proof method for intentional discrimination; instead, it can be used
to challenge practices that disproportionately burden protected
groups, whether or not an intent to discriminate is present.
Needless to say, elimination of any intent requirement avoids the
need to determine whether cognitive biases constitute "intent."
C. The Present Statutory Requisites
In sum, Title VII now permits a plaintiff to establish disparate
impact discrimination simply by showing that a "particular
employer practice" has a disparate impact on a protected group.
Even a plaintiff who cannot make that showing, can still establish
the theory by showing that the employer's entire selection process
has a disparate impact and that the components of that process
cannot be separated by analysis. At that point, the employer has the
burden of showing that business necessity and job relation justify
the practice. 220 Finally, plaintiff can prevail even when the defendant carries its burden of persuasion if the plaintiff can prove the
alternative employment practice prong.
Compared to the enormous problems this Article has canvassed
in both defining and proving "intent" in a disparate treatment case,
disparate impact indeed appears like an oasis in the desert. Why,
then, have so many sojourners passed it by? As addressed in Part
IV, disparate impact has both downsides and difficulties, but
claiming with a straight face that they are more imposing than
those facing disparate treatment is difficult.
219. See George Rutherglen, DisparateImpact Under Title VII: An Objective Theory of
Discrimination,73 VA. L. REv. 1297, 1297-99 (1987) (arguing that the only defensible basis
for disparate impact under Title VII as it was originally enacted was to reach hidden
intentional discrimination).
220. When a multicomponent process is at stake, the employer can avoid justifying any
practice that it can show does not have a disparate impact. See supranote 191.
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IV. THE CRITICS OF DISPARATE IMPACT

Disparate impact has been in disrepute among scholars for some
time. For example, two of the leading proponents of the cognitive
bias approach to discrimination, Professors Linda Krieger and
Tristin Green attempt to reform the disparate treatment tleory as
a means of implementing their theories, rather than reforming
disparate impact.221 Indeed, Professor Krieger writes, without a hint
of irony, that "[T]he disparate impact paradigm as currently
constructed is an inappropriate analytical tool for addressing the
intergroup biases inherent in subjective decisionmaking. '222
Although this is literally true, Professor Krieger's article convincingly demonstrates that the disparate treatment paradigm "as
currently constructed" is also an inappropriate analytical tool for
dealing with these problems. In short, Krieger's focus is misplaced:
if one paradigm for reconstruction must be picked, repair work
ought to focus on disparate treatment.
What then are the shortcomings of disparate impact? Some of its
limitations are apparent: the lack ofjury trial,223 limited remedies,224
and statutory exemptions for seniority systems and drug testing
policies.225 Although these are authentic problems,226 they are not
the reason why commentators have rejected disparate impact, nor
can they entirely explain the paucity of suits filed under that theory,
221. In contrast, Professor Krieger's criticisms are discussed beginning infra at note 227.
Professor Green's critique is discussed beginning infra at note 230. Professor Sturm seems
less concerned with the precise meaning of discrimination than with the development of
structures and processes to deal with it: '"Legality' emerges from an interactive process of
information gathering, problem identification, remediation, and evaluation. Regulation fosters
dynamic interactions that cut across established conceptual, professional, and organizational
boundaries in reaction to observed problems." Sturm, supra note 33, at 463.
222. Krieger, supra note 31, at 1231.
223. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2000).
224. Id.
225. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000).
226. Professor Shoben writes that Griggs and disparate impact "remain largely untapped
resources of enormous potential for plaintiffs." Elaine W. Shoben, DisparateImpact Theory
in Employment Discrimination:What's Griggs Still Good For? What Not?, 42 BRANDEIs L.J.
597, 597 (2004). She views perhaps the most important reason "disparate impact litigation
has been languishing is that its potential is not often appreciated by the practicing bar," id.
at 600, perhaps in large part because of the absence of compensatory or punitive damages for
disparate impact claims.
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especially because disparate impact could be deployed as an
alternative theory of liability in what is primarily a disparate
treatment case.
One set of objections is essentially formalistic. Professor Krieger
views disparate impact as theoretically "the wrong tool to address
subjective decisionmaking because it presupposes a significantly
different type of bias from those at play in subjective practices cases.
From a phenomenological standpoint, subjective practices discrimination is a disparate treatment problem, not a disparate impact
problem, and it requires a disparate treatment solution."2 2' 7 This is
a puzzling statement: disparate impact presupposes a "different
type of bias" than disparate treatment precisely because it does not
require any bias at all, as that term is usually used. In any event,
why Krieger believes that the "bias" of disparate impact does not
embrace the bias of disparate treatment is unclear. This critique
must be "phenomenological" because it cannot be doctrinal in view
of Watson's holding that disparate impact is applicable to subjective
practices.2 2 8 And one need not adopt Justice O'Connor's implication
that disparate impact is designed to deal with hidden biases 229 to
recognize that, among other situations, the theory can be used when
a hidden bias exists in the form of either a conscious but concealed
bias or a purely unconscious bias.
A similar criticism can be directed against Professor Green. Her
workplace dynamics approach "places much needed emphasis on
structural factors"2 3 and therefore she acknowledges it shares some
characteristics with disparate impact. 231 Nevertheless, she turns
227. Krieger, supra note 31, at 1231. For Professor Krieger's other criticisms, see infra note
294.
228. Krieger, supra note 31, at 1231. For Professor Krieger's other criticisms, see infra note
289.
229. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
230. Green, Workplace Dynamics, supranote 32, at 92. In part this is because the dynamics
she discusses often result in "decreased opportunity for disfavored groups without producing
a single, identifiable discriminatory decision ...." Id.
231. Structural disparate treatment "draws from disparate impact theory its emphasis on
systems and practices, while sharing with traditional disparate treatment theory its
understanding of discrimination as a human problem and its aim of eradicating differences
in treatment in the workplace." Id. at 145. Like disparate impact, structural disparate
treatment would look to "[n]umerical disparities in outcome," but not (as in systemic disparate
treatment) as evidence of purposeful discrimination, but rather "as a signal that
discriminatory bias may be operating in workplace dynamics." Id. at 146. Plaintiffs might also
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to disparate treatment to implement her concept: "despite its
importance to the antidiscrimination project, disparate impact
theory is also ill-suited to the task of combating the operation of
' Her essential point
discriminatory bias in the modern workplace."2 32
is that the label "disparate treatment" is superior (and therefore
reformulating disparate treatment doctrine is preferable to revising
disparate impact) precisely because it brings home that the problem
is bias, not negligence or accident.23 3 The problem, of course, is that
this proves too much: the advantage of the bias-related label, and
even its accuracy, depends on defining "bias" in a nonintuitive way.
If, under Watson, disparate impact is capable of dealing with any set
of workplace structures that result in disadvantages on race or
gender grounds, the benefit of focusing on bias rather than effect is
not apparent, at least if the moral power of attacking "bias" is
increasingly attenuated as the term's definition is expanded.2 34
A second level of concern may simply be a generalized fear that
the courts will fashion doctrinal limitations on disparate impact
that will eviscerate the theory. Given the history of disparate
treatment, such apprehension is understandable, but, given that
same history, it is not apparent why refashioning disparate
treatment offers greater hope. For example, the judicial creation
and expansion of the "adverse employment action" requirement for
disparate treatment cases has resulted in hundreds of cases being
dismissed.2 3 5 Although the lower courts have suggested some
look to "firsthand anecdotal testimony as well as ... testimony of social scientists,
psychologists, or other experts to demonstrate that the employer's particular workplace
environment facilitates the operation of discriminatory bias." Id.
232. Id. at 138.
233. Id. ("The operation of discriminatory bias, in contrast, whether cognitive or
motivational, is a human problem, one that inheres in people, albeit in the larger social
context in which they work."). While recognizing that disparate impact may apply to
subjective employment criteria, the problem of workplace dynamics is less whether subjective
criteria themselves are invalid than whether subjective decision making has a "tendency to
enable, facilitate, or permit the operation of discriminatory bias." Id. at 142. This may be true,
but it does not explain what makes such practices not suitable to disparate impact attack.
234. Other commentators also view disparate impact as too limited to address the
phenomenon of cognitive bias but are no clearer as to why this should be so. E.g., Poirier,
supra note 36, at 469 ('The current statutory law requires identification of a 'particular
employment practice' causing disparate impact discrimination. It is not clear whether the
common workplace interactions that lead to unreflective discrimination would ever fit that
description.").
235. See 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supra note 109, § 2.06.
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limitations to disparate impact, none is nearly as well established
as the adverse employment action requirement.
For example, one circuit has held that the employer must
affirmatively adopt the at-issue practice for the practice to qualify.
In EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, the employer relied
upon word-of-mouth recruiting for hiring.2 36 The court refused to
permit the EEOC's impact claim to proceed because the employees'
actions of referring their friends and relatives and not any employer
policy caused the impact.2 37 For the court, "passive reliance" on
employee action is not an employer policy for purposes of disparate
impact analysis.2"' This case's authority, however, is dubious. Not
only does it conflict with precedents from other circuits holding
word-of-mouth recruitment subject to disparate impact analysis,2 3 9
but it was decided before the 1991 Amendments controlled, and the
rendering court has suggested more recently that employer inaction
can form the basis for an impact claim.24 °
Another court-engrafted limitation has been described differently,
being termed by some a "volitional exception"2 4' and by others a
"personal preference"2 4' 2 or voluntarism exception24 3 or as an
employee duty to make reasonable efforts.2 44 Although the different
formulations suggest different rationales and scopes, the core notion
is that some employer requirements ought not to be subject to
disparate impact analysis because employees or prospective
employees can, more or less easily, conform their conduct to the
requirement. The classic example is Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., in
236. EEOC v. Chi. Miniature Lamp Works, 947 F.2d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 1991).
237. Id. at 305.
238. Id.
239. E.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 425 (5th Cir. 1998); Thomas v.
Wash. County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d 922, 924-26 (4th Cir. 1990).
240. DeClue v. Cent. Ill. Light Co., 223 F.3d 434, 437 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that
employer's failure to provide restroom facilities was not sexual harassment, but suggesting
that plaintiff might have fared better had she asserted a disparate impact claim).
241. 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supra note 109, § 4.02[C][2].
242. Shoben, supra note 226, at 619.
243. Sandi Farrell, Toward Getting Beyond the Blame Game: A Critique of the Ideology of
Voluntarism in Title VII Jurisprudence,92 KY. L.J. 483, 493 (2003/2004).
244. Laya Sleiman, Note, A Duty to Make ReasonableEfforts and a Defense of the Disparate
Impact Doctrine in Employment DiscriminationLaw, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 2677, 2682 (2004)
(arguing that disparate impact should permit recovery "only when plaintiffs have put forth
reasonable efforts (in light of the circumstances and surrounding conditions) to comply with
an employer's hiring criteria").
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which the employer required its bilingual employees to speak only
English on the job. 245 Although the rule fell more harshly on
employees of Mexican origin than others, the Ninth Circuit found it
immune from disparate impact attack. Bilingual employees could
comply with the rule and thus could avoid discipline.24 6
A volitional exception is more or less problematic depending on
what conduct is defined as volitional,2 47 but it is scarcely well
established. Spun Steak's authority is limited because it was not
governed by the 1991 Amendments, but a post-Act decision,
Lanning v. SEPTA,2 48 revived the notion. In that case, employment
as a transit police officer was dependent upon each candidate
running 1.5 miles within twelve minutes.2 49 The plaintiffs alleged
that the requirement had a disparate impact on female applicants,
and the employer responded that the run measured the minimum
aerobic capacity necessary to perform a police officer's job successfully.25 ° Ultimately, the Third Circuit upheld the policy, in part
because nearly all women would be able to pass after only a
moderate amount of training.2 5 ' The court did not think it unreasonable to expect women to train prior to applying; doing so, the court
said, would demonstrate their commitment to the job. 2 Obviously,
this suggests some version of a volitional exception to disparate
impact analysis.
A final possible exception to disparate impact is compensation
and fringe benefits. In Los Angeles Departmentof Water and Power

245. Garcia v. Spun Steak Co., 998 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1993).
246. Id. at 1488.
247. For example, a broad definition might even find requirements such as a high school
diploma volitional, which Griggs clearly precludes. In any event, such an exception to
disparate impact has been defended as consistent with the theory's focus on employment
opportunity: to the extent employees can relatively easily conform their conduct to the rule,
there is no limitation on opportunities. But the contrary argument is that a work rule that
disparately places at risk women or minority group members is a barrierto employment
opportunities within the meaning of Connecticut v. Teal, even if not so high a barrier as other
obstacles. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
248. 308 F.3d 286 (3d Cir. 2002); see Sleiman, supra note 244 (arguing that disparate
impact should be measured only with respect to those who made reasonable efforts to meet
the employer's criterion).

249.
250.
251.
252.

Id. at 288.
Id. at 291-92.
Id. at 287.
Id.
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2 5 3 females successfully challenged an employer's
v. Manhart,
requirement that women contribute more than men to pensions
because women as a group live longer than men.2 54 The employer's
policy was struck down as facial discrimination; in the course of its
opinion, however, the Court addressed the employer's argument
that, if pension contributions were equalized, the system would
disproportionately impact men because men as a group have
shorter lives than women.2 55 In rejecting that argument, the Court
suggested that that disparate impact analysis might not be
applicable to fringe benefits.2 56 Manhartwas decided before
the 1991
257
Amendments and is, in any event, a cryptic opinion.
Along the same lines, however, the Seventh Circuit has held that
disparate impact does not apply to fringe benefits. In Finnegan v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc.,2 58 the employer, faced with the need to
cut its labor costs, capped vacations at four weeks; this policy

253. 435 U.S. 702 (1978).
254. Id. at 723.
255. Id. at 716-17.
256. Id. at 710 n.20. This same passage might also (or instead) suggest that males could
not invoke the theory. See Sullivan, supra note 148, at 1529.
257. Further, sex-based disparate impact claims involving compensation may require
consideration of the Equal Pay Act's effect on Title VII. The Bennett Amendment, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(h) (2003), permits an employer "to differentiate upon the basis of sex in determining
the amount of wages or compensation paid or to be paid to employees of such employer if such
differentiation is authorized by the provisions" of the Equal Pay Act. In County of Washington
v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161 (1981), the Supreme Court ruled that this language "suggests an
intention to incorporate only the affirmative defenses of the Equal Pay Act into Title VII." Id.
at 168. With regard to those defenses, the Court stated that the EPA "inessence 'authorizes'
employers to differentiate in pay on the basis of seniority, merit, quantity or quality of
production, or any other factor other than sex, even though such differentiation might
otherwise violate the Act. It is to these provisions, therefore, that the Bennett Amendment
must refer." Id. at 169. Since such factors might (but for the Bennett Amendment) have a
disparate impact and be actionable under Title VII, the Amendment can be read to bar
disparate impact attacks on gender grounds with respect to compensation.
258. 967 F.2d 1161 (7th Cir. 1992); accord DiBiase v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 48 F.3d
719, 732 (3d Cir. 1995). In DiBiase, the court, assuming arguendo a policy of offering
enhanced benefits to laid-off workers in return for releases fell more harshly on older workers
than younger workers, stated:
such a neutral policy-which does not rely on an invidious stereotype about
older employees, which clearly is not motivated by a discriminatory impulse, and
which could be demonstrated to have a disparate impact only by the use of an
incredibly sophisticated statistical analysis-simply cannot be the basis of
ADEA liability.
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reduced the number of vacation weeks for which longer-service
workers would be eligible, and therefore disproportionately
impacted workers age forty and above.2 59 Nevertheless, assuming
without deciding that the theory was available under the ADEA,26 °
259. Finnegan, 967 F.2d at 1162.
260. The question of whether disparate impact is available under the ADEA was
unresolved until the last Term, when the Supreme Court decided in Smith v. City of Jackson,
125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005), that the theory may be invoked under the ADEA. The rationale for the
Court's holding was that "when Congress uses the same language in two statutes having
similar purposes, particularly when one is enacted shortly after the other, it is appropriate
to presume that Congress intended that text to have the same meaning in both statutes." City
of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1541. Because disparate impact applied to Title VII cases under
Griggs, it must also apply to ADEA cases.
City of Jackson, however, made clear that the version of disparate impact applicable in age
discrimination cases is that defined in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
As we have seen, Wards Cove cut back substantially on the disparate impact theory under
Title VII. See supratext accompanying notes 177-82. Because Wards Cove was framed as an
interpretation of Title VII as it was originally enacted, the City of Jackson Court's principle
of parallel construction mandated that the ADEA incorporate the weak version of disparate
impact articulated in Wards Cove. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 codified and strengthened
disparate impact under Title VII, but not the ADEA; thus, Wards Cove continues to control
ADEA cases.
Indeed, the ADEA has a provision, not found in Title VII, which the Court suggested may
even further weaken disparate impact under the ADEA. The provision in question states that
"[i]t shall not be unlawful for an employer ... to take any action otherwise prohibited ... where
the differentiation is based on reasonable factors other than age [RFOA] .... 29 U.S.C. §
623(f)(1) (2000). As interpreted by City of Jackson, Congress's decision to limit the coverage
of the ADEA by including the RFOA provision is consistent with the fact that age, unlike race
or other classifications protected by Title VII, not uncommonly has relevance to an
individual's capacity to engage in certain types of employment. To be sure, Congress
recognized that this is not always the case and that society may perceive those differences to
be larger or more consequential than they are in fact. As Secretary Wirtz noted in his report,
however, "certain circumstances ... unquestionably affect older workers more strongly, as a

group, than they do younger workers." DEPT. OF LABOR,

THE OLDER AMERICAN WORKER: AGE

DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 11 (1965). Thus, it is not surprising that certain employment
criteria that are routinely used may be reasonable despite their adverse impact on older
workers as a group. 'Moreover, intentional discrimination on the basis of age has not occurred
at the same levels as discrimination against those protected by Title VII." City of Jackson, 125
S. Ct. at 1545; accord DEPT. OF LABOR, supra, at 2, 5-6. "While the ADEA reflects Congress'
intent to give older workers employment opportunities whenever possible, the RFOA
provision reflects this historical difference." City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1545.
Not surprisingly, given the double-dilution of disparate impact claims under the ADEA,
City of Jackson affirmed dismissal of the suit despite holding the disparate impact theory
available. Plaintiffs had not identified "specific employment practices" causing the proven
impact, as Wards Cove required, id., and any disparate impact attributable to the City's
decision to give raises based on seniority and rank was "unquestionably reasonable": the
"decision to grant a larger raise to lower echelon employees for the purpose of bringing
salaries in line with that of surrounding police forces was a decision based on a 'reasonable
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the court found no case of disparate impact had been stated.2"' The
court pointed out that any change in compensation packages would
impact older workers because "virtually all elements of a standard
compensation package are positively correlated with age. 26 2
Finnegan was cited in a concurring opinion the Supreme Court's
2 63 which, while upholdrecent decision in Smith v. City of Jackson,
ing disparate impact under the ADEA, applied a very crabbed
version of the theory. 2 4 The citation of Finnegan, however, was
directed to the proposition that adjustments in fringe benefits would
likely have a disparate impact on older workers, thereby explaining
why Congress chose to more permissively justify age-based disparate impact than other kinds of discrimination.2 6 The Court did not
suggest that disparate impact was inapplicable to fringe benefit
analysis, as had Finnegan.
In sum, the circuit courts have occasionally sought to limit the
employment practices to which disparate impact applies. But the
authority, even collectively, is not strong, and to the extent that City
of Jackson rejects the most radical view, even less authoritative.
factor other than age' that responded to the City's legitimate goal of retaining police officers."
Id. at 1546.
261. Finnegan,967 F.2d at 1163 ("[This case makes no sense in disparate impact terms."
(emphasis omitted)).
262. Id. at 1164.
263. 125 S. Ct. 1536 (2005).
264. See supranote 260.
265. The concurring opinion noted that the Department of Labor's report, see supra note
260, which was the basis of the ADEA, "concluded that-unlike the classifications protected
by Title VII-there often is a correlation between an individual's age and her ability to
perform a job." City of Jackson, 125 S. Ct. at 1555 (O'Connor, Kennedy & Thomas, JJ.,
concurring). The Justices attributed this to the general decline with age of physical and
sometimes mental ability, as well as to advances in technology and education that "often leave
older workers at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis younger workers." Id. The Justices
continued:
Beyond these performance-affecting factors, there is also the fact that many
employment benefits, such as salary, vacation time, and so forth, increase as an
employee gains experience and seniority. See, e.g., Finnegan v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 967 F.2d 1161, 1164 (C.A.7 1992) ("[V]irtually all elements of a
standard compensation package are positively correlated with age").
Accordingly, many employer decisions that are intended to cut costs or respond
to market forces will likely have a disproportionate effect on older workers.
Given the myriad ways in which legitimate business practices can have a
disparate impact on older workers, it is hardly surprising that Congress declined
to subject employers to civil liability based solely on such effects.
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What is clear, at least, is that judicial resistance in this area has yet
to manifest itself as strongly as in the impressive doctrinal barriers
the lower courts have historically erected to disparate treatment
claims.26 6 Of course, that might be more for lack of opportunity than
for lack of disposition, but we will see some reasons, somewhat
counterintuitively, why the courts may be less hostile to challenges
framed in disparate impact terms than they have been to disparate
treatment attacks.2 67
A third set of objections to using disparate impact is more
focused, looking to limitations on the doctrine as it has been
codified. Two arguments may be advanced. First, building on some
of the cases this Article has mentioned, it is possible that "particular
employment practices" do not reach most of the conduct of concern.
A related, but distinct, argument is that identifying which "particular" practice, among many potentially contributing to "bad stats" at
the bottom line, will often be difficult or impossible. Neither of these
objections is unfounded, but both are overdrawn.
As for a "particular employment practice," a key feature distinguishing disparate impact from disparate treatment claims is
identifying a facially neutral employment practice that causes a
disparate impact based on race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin. Systemic disparate treatment claims can focus on the total
results of an employer's hiring practices and sometimes infer
discriminatory purpose from "bad stats, 26 8 but § 703(k) is more
limited with respect to disparate impact. As discussed above, it
requires the plaintiff to "demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice causes a disparate impact, 269 although
be analyzed as one
it permits "the decisionmaking process [to] ...
employment practice" when the plaintiff can prove that "the
elements of [an employer's] ...decisionmaking process are not
266. A continuing instance is the requirement of an "adverse employment action." See
supra note 151. Another example was the "pretext plus" rule that emerged in the wake of
Hicks, see Zimmer, supra note 74, and prospered in some circuits until it was finally
dismantled by Reeves v. Sanderson PlumbingProducts, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-49 (2000).
267. Professor Green seems to recognize this possibility when she argues that her
structural proposals, albeit labeled as disparate treatment, should be pursued by equitable
relief rather than full legal damages. See Green, Work Culture,supra note 32, at 667.
268. E.g., Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 334-43 (1977); Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 306-13 (1977).
269. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (B) (2000).
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capable of separation for analysis."2 70 In short, the plaintiff normally
has the burden of identifying the specific practice she claims is
posing a barrier to her group and then proving it does so.
Although most disparate impact cases have focused on selection
devices or discrete policies, 2 71 the statutory language is far broader
and Watson approved an attack on a practice that amounted simply
to the defendant's way of doing business. Admittedly, there are
instances in which it is unclear what, if any, employer practice
causes a particular bad bottom line. For example, in EEOC v. Joe's
Stone Crab,27 2 there were almost no female waitstaff in a restaurant,
despite the large number of waitresses in the local labor market.2
However, no significant difference existed between the number of
females the employer hired and the number of females who sought
positions at the restaurant's "roll calls" for new waiters. 4 The
Eleventh Circuit ultimately concluded that none of the challenged
practices caused the discrepancy and therefore rejected the disparate impact claim.2 75 The absence of female applicants was apparently due to Joe's reputation for hiring only males, which was
caused, at least in part by its "Old World" theme invoking images of
male waiters in tuxedos. 6 The reputation itself could not be a
practice at all (although the employer might be responsible for the
practices, if any, that gave rise to the reputation), and the EEOC
never argued that the restaurant's theme had a disparate impact by
perpetuating the reputation.2 7 7 This was perhaps because it viewed
the theme as a business practice rather than as an employment
practice, despite possible effects on employment, or perhaps because
270. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
271. E.g., Alexander v. Local 496, Laborers' Int'l Union of N. Am., 177 F.3d 394, 400 (6th
Cir. 1999) (residency requirement); United States v. City of Warren, 138 F.3d 1083, 1088 (6th
Cir. 1998) (residency requirement); EEOC v. S.S. Clerks Union Local 1066, 48 F.3d 594, 599
(1st Cir. 1995) (policy requiring sponsorship by existing member); Fitzpatrick v. City of
Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1113 (11th Cir. 1993) (no-beard policy); Bradley v. Pizzaco of Neb., Inc.,
7 F.3d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1993) (no-beard policy); Thomas v. Wash. County Sch. Bd., 915 F.2d
922, 924-25 (4th Cir. 1990) (nepotism); see also Lynch v. Freeman, 817 F.2d 380, 381 (6th Cir.
1987) (providing filthy restrooms).
272. 220 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000).
273. Id. at 1267, 1270-71.
274. Id. at 1270-71.
275. Id. at 1282.
276. Id. at 1282-83.
277. Id. at 1281-82.
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retaining the theme might have been justifiable as a business
necessity.2 78 Joe's Stone Crab illustrates that situations
exist in
2 79
which disparate impact will be of limited utility.
But it does not justify a broad skepticism about whether disparate
impact will reach most practices affecting employment. Although
there are decisions finding plaintiffs have failed to link a particular
practice to a disparate impact, other cases have traced impact to
particular practices.2 8 ° Contrary to some suggestions, there is no
basis in the history of § 703(k) to permit "particular" to be used to
narrow the application of disparate impact. As Professor H6bert
argues,
[t]he broad statutory language, with the term "employment
practice" modified only by the term "particular," imposes no
restriction on the type of practice that can be challenged under
the disparate impact theory; the term "particular" appears only
to impose a requirement that the practice alleged to cause the
disproportionate negative effects on the protected group be
identified with particularity. This interpretation of the statute
is confirmed by the legislative history 28....
1
278. Nor did the EEOC attack the bottom line on the ground that the employer's hiring
processes were not capable of separation for analysis, presumably because the hiring process
per se was capable of being analyzed. The court noted:
During the post-charge period (from 1991 to 1995), many more women (in all,
22% of the actual applicant pool) applied for food server positions. Of Joe's 88
new food server hires during this period, 19 were women. These post-charge
figures translate into a female hiring percentage of 21.7%--a percentage almost
exactly proportional to the percentage of females in the actual applicant pool.

Id. at 1270-71.
279. The court, however, remanded for a determination of whether the way the defendant
implemented its "Old World" atmosphere constituted disparate treatment. The district court
duly so found. EEOC v. Joe's Stone Crab, Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1311, 1312 (S.D. Fla. 2001),
affd in relevantpart, 296 F.3d 1265 (11th Cir. 2002).
280. Compare Mufioz v. Orr, 200 F.3d 291, 304 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that the plaintiffs
did not present sufficient evidence to allow a court to draw conclusions about the separate
components of defendant's hiring system), and Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d
1277, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994) (concluding plaintiffs had not traced a disparate impact to a specific
policy or practice), with Green v. USX Corp., 896 F.2d 801, 805 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[The
subjective interviews had a significantly disparate impact on blacks, as the percentage of
successful black interviewees was significantly less than the overall percentage of successful
interviewees."). But see Anderson v. Westinghouse Savannah River Co., 406 F.2d 248 (4th Cir.
2005) (seeming to confuse disparate treatment with disparate impact in rejecting a challenge
to certain subjective steps in a selection process).
281. L. Camille H~bert, The DisparateImpact of Sexual Harassment:Does Motive Matter?,
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Likewise, Professor Michelle Travis argues that "particular
employment practice" was not intended "to limit the types of
workplace structures that would be subject to disparate impact
challenge under Griggs, nor to exclude default organizational
' Rather, "particular" was used to resolve the Wards Cove
norms."2 82
issue:
whether an employee could state a prima facie disparate impact
case solely by identifying a statistical disparity between the
percentage of the employer's workforce that was made up of
members of a protected category and the percentage of that
category in the relevant labor pool: the so-called "bottom line"
approach."'
Not only does § 703(k) require the plaintiff to identify the
particular practice to be challenged, but it also requires her to
"demonstrate that each particular challenged employment practice
causes a disparate impact."2& The second objection then is that
identifying "particular" causes of disparate impact may be impossible when an overall process is examined. This may explain in large
part the skepticism about disparate impact by scholars such as
Professor Green who believe that "both conscious and unconscious
bias operate at multiple levels of social interaction, often resulting
in decreased opportunity for disfavored groups without producing a
single, identifiable discriminatory decision."285 In such a gestalt
setting, can any single practice be identical that causes the untoward results?
Again, the objection is not completely unfounded. Joe's Stone Crab
illustrates that employment practices may not cause an impact at
all-any discrepancy in minority or female representation may be
caused by other factors. But this critique also is overdrawn. The
problem is largely a question of framing: the broader the practice is
framed, the more likely it explains bottom line results. "Subjective"

53 U. KAN. L. REV. 341, 380 (2005).
282. Michelle A. Travis, Recapturing the Transformative Potential of Employment
DiscriminationLaw, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 3, 80 (2005).
283. Id.
284. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A), (B) (2000).
285. See Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 32, at 92.
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hiring or promotion practices, for example, as in Watson, seem to
cover a lot of ground. Further, the statute explicitly permits a
"decisionmaking process [to] ...
be analyzed as one employment
practice" when the plaintiff can prove that "the elements of [an
employer's] ... decisionmaking process are not capable of separation
' In short, although
for analysis."2 86
the plaintiff "normally" has the
burden of identifying the specific practice she claims causes the
disparity she identifies, she need not do so if the employer's process
is not "capable" of being subdivided for such purposes. In Watson
itself, for example, one wonders
how the process could have been
7
separated for analysis.
Further, not only have a number of courts found challenges to
entire systems to be viable,"' but the litigation process would also
286. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2000); see Stout v. Potter, 276 F.3d 1118, 1125 (9th Cir.
2002).
287. Presumably plaintiff could have shown bad bottom line results-proportionately fewer
blacks in successively higher levels, although small numbers problems may have limited this
to the first promotion. Alternatively, plaintiff could have looked at the applicants for
promotion and shown that proportionately fewer black applicants were promoted.
288. E.g., Emanuel v. Marsh, 897 F.2d 1435, 1443 (8th Cir. 1990) ("By proving the
existence of relevant statistical disparities within the Army's workplace and a causal
connection between these disparities and the Army's use of subjective performance awards,
Emanuel has established a prima facie case of disparate impact."); Kozlowski v. Fry, 238 F.
Supp. 2d 996, 1014 (N.D. M. 2002) (allowing challenge where plaintiffs argued "that the entire
decisionmaking process, including the interview process, 'must hire' list, and ...
[employer's]
alleged job posting failures, make a breakdown of the employment process into a specific
process untenable"); McClain v. Lufkin Indus., Inc., 187 F.R.D. 267, 281-82 (E.D. Tex. 1999)
(certifying class action in part because of plaintiffs' claim that a subjective system of assigning
job classifications to employees disadvantaged African Americans); Butler v. Home Depot Inc.,
No. C-94-4335 S1, C-95-2182 S1, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16296, at *50 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 28,
1997) (finding plaintiffs made a prima facie showing of disparate impact with respect to the
hiring, initial assignment, promotion, and compensation practices); Graffam v. Scott Paper
Co., 870 F. Supp. 389, 395 (D. Me. 1994) ("IT]he Court is satisfied that in this case the entire
subjective decisional process may be analyzed as one practice."); Contardo v. Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 753 F. Supp. 406, 410-11 (D. Mass. 1990) (mixing disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories to find a violation even when "the evidence adduced
by the plaintiff admittedly does not furnish a quantum of data to support a true statistical
analysis, ... [where there was] sufficient circumstantial evidence to warrant a finding that the
plaintiff was the victim of sex discrimination in the course of her employment by the
defendant," although that discrimination was "relatively covert, and habitual, even mindless,
rather than pre-meditated"); see also Stender v. Lucky Stores, No. C-88-1467 MHP, 1992 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12415, at *5-6 (N.D. Cal. July 14, 1992) ("Where the system of promotion is
pervaded by a lack of uniform criteria, criteria that are subjective as well as variable, ... the
court is not required to 'pinpoint particular aspects of [the system]' that were unfavorable to
women." (quoting Sept. 11, 1991 Order at 31)). But see Chavez v. Coors Brewing Co., No. 98-
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seem to permit the plaintiff to claim that an entire process is
incapable of separation, leaving the defendant to demonstrate the
contrary.289 If a defendant does so, it almost necessarily will have to
show which components have a disparate impact and which do not.
Indeed, the statute provides the defendant with an incentive to
establish that certain components have no impact because it
specifies that a defendant does not need to justify any such components.29 ° This does not seem impossible. Professor Chamallas, for
example, calls for applying disparate impact to wage equity claims.
Although she recognizes the need to identify causes of disparate
impact in multicomponent systems, she is not pessimistic about the
ability of the courts to do so, especially in light of the statutory
exception for processes that are incapable of being separated for
analysis.2 9 '
1109, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 5300 at *10 (10th Cir. Mar. 25, 1999) (rejecting disparate impact
attack because plaintiff failed to identify any particular aspect of the selection process that
had a disparate impact on Hispanics).
289. Alternatively, the plaintiff might run a regression analysis of, say, successful and
unsuccessful candidates for promotion in order to determine what factors predict success. In
that sense, a plaintiff may be able to "separate for analysis" various factors. Defendant would
then have a few choices, none attractive. First, defendant could accept the regression, leaving
the plaintiff to prove the disparate impact of one or more components. Second, the defendant
could attack the regression but not offer a counter analysis, which would amount to admitting
that the process is not capable of being separated for analysis. Third, the defendant could offer
a competing regression, but in so doing it would identify components the plaintiff could then
focus on.
290. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 703(k)(1)(B)(ii), 105 Stat. 1074.
291. Martha Chamallas, The Market Excuse, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 579, 610-11 (2001)
(reviewing ROBERT L. NELSON & WILLIAM P. BRIDGES, LEGALIZING GENDER INEQUALITY:
COURTS, MARKETS, AND UNEQUAL PAY FOR WOMEN IN AMERICA (1999)).
The critical question boils down to whether the courts will regard an employer's
wage policy as "one employment practice" for purposes of pay equity litigation
and relieve plaintiffs of the particularity requirement. Although this question
turns on whether the court concludes that the "elements of an [employer's]
decisionmaking process cannot be separated for analysis," it is likely that in
making this technical determination the court will consider the fairness of
imposing evidentiary burdens on the respective parties....
In support of disparate impact theory, plaintiffs could argue that it is
practically impossible for them to pinpoint the cause of the wage disparity and
that it makes sense to require the employer to prove that its compensation
policies are indeed market based. Such an assignment of the burden of proof
would encourage employers to acquire and maintain market-oriented data on
compensation and might have the salutary effect of checking the tendency to
overvalue some predominantly male jobs.
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. Still another set of objections revolves around what might be
called "the class problem." This has two aspects. First, disparate
impact is conceived of as class-based litigation, typically pursued
either in formal class actions or by the EEOC in pattern and
practice cases. 29 1 When a single plaintiff considers challenging what
appears to be an ad hoc decision, her attorney probably rarely
thinks of raising a disparate impact claim,2 93 and when the attorney
does consider the disparate impact alternative, she may be daunted
by the costs of the proof process 294 and by the procedural barriers to
filing a class action.29 5
This Article will return to the proof problem in the final section
because plaintiffs proof of impact and defendant's business
necessity response are the core questions in reviving disparate

292. Shoben, supra note 226, at 598 (describing disparate impact as "inherently a classbased theory"). She goes on to argue that "class actions are difficult, if not impossible, for
private plaintiffs to undertake unless they involve the possibility of very large damage
awards." Id.
293. Professor Shoben believes that "perhaps [the) most important [] reason that disparate
impact litigation has been languishing is that its potential is not often appreciated by the
practicing bar," id. at 600, although she also identifies other causes for the relative neglect
of the theory, including the absence of compensatory or punitive damages for disparate impact
claims, resources problems with class actions, employer elimination of the most easily
targeted policies, and restrictions on the theory developing in the circuit courts. Id. at 598-99.
294. Professor Krieger has "practical" and "political" arguments against disparate impact,
in addition to her theoretical one, see supra text accompanying note 227, but the political one
collapses into the practical one. Practically, impact theory lacks the empirical tools that can
be effectively applied to complex, subjective situations. Politically, "it is only disparate
impact's grounding in empiricism which provides its political legitimacy as a civil rights
theory in the face of competing normative claims," so the absence of empirical tools is
politically problematic. Krieger, supranote 31, at 1231. Krieger's argument about empiricism
is built almost entirely on her assessment of the difficulty of applying test validation
procedures to subjective decision making. See id. at 1232. Because such validation is
impossible or prohibitively expensive
if a court applies disparate impact theory in subjective practices cases, one of
two undesirable outcomes will necessarily result: either the validation
requirement will be weakened or eliminated entirely, as already appears to be
occurring, or its imposition will place severe and ultimately unworkable burdens
on small and medium-sized employers.
Id. Although she recognizes that less empirical approaches are possible, she criticizes them
as not "a politically viable alternative to validation." Id. at 1236; see infra text accompanying
notes 343-46.
295. See generally 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supra note 109, § 12.18 (discussing
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 for filing a class action lawsuit, as well
as problems for class actions filed under Title VII of the ADA).
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impact, 296 but we may put to one side the procedural class action
question. Disparate impact theory may be used by a plaintiff in an
individual suit, although of course a plaintiffs attorney might want
to consider whether the advantages of framing the claim as a class
action outweigh the disadvantages. Although some circuits have
suggested that systemic disparate treatment challenges can be
mounted only in the context of a private class action or a government pattern or practice case, 297 no such authority exists for
disparate impact. Indeed, individuals have raised numerous
disparate impact claims without the umbrella of a class action.2 9
A final, and troubling, objection to a more robust use of disparate
impact is simply that the theory forfeits the moral high ground that
validates the core disparate treatment prohibition,2 99 that is, that
such a turn renders Title VII merely another regulatory regime"
296. See infra text accompanying notes 340-43.
297. E.g., Lowery v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 158 F.3d 742, 759-62 (4th Cir. 1998), vacated
on other grounds, 527 U.S. 1031 (1999) (reasoning that the only authorization for pattern or
practice suits was § 707 of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6, which authorizes such suits only by
the government). While the court recognized that InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v.

United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977), extended this principle to class actions, it did not believe
that individual suits could properly challenge discrimination other than through the
individual disparate treatment paradigm. Lowery, 158 F.3d at 759-62. Other cases, both
before and after Lowery, have made similar statements, typically with very limited analysis.
See, e.g., Bacon v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 370 F.3d 565, 575 (6th Cir. 2004); Celestine v.
Petroleos de Venez. SA, 266 F.3d 343,355-56 (5th Cir. 2001); Babrocky v. Jewel Food Co., 773
F.2d 857, 866-67 n.6 (7th Cir. 1985). But see Cox v. Am. Cast Iron Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546,
1559 (11th Cir. 1986). See generally David J. Bross, Note, The Use of Pattern-and-Practiceby
Individuals in Non-class Claims, 28 NOVA L. REV. 795 (2004) (discussing the split among the
circuit courts on the question of whether evidence of pattern-and-practice discrimination can
be used to shift the burden of proof in individual lawsuits and agreeing with the minority view
in favor of such a rule).
298. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982) (not a class action); Robinson v.
Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010, 1016 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Coe v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc.,
646 F.2d 444, 451 (10th Cir. 1981)) (stating that although an individual is entitled to bring
a disparate impact claim, plaintiff must show that he has been injured by the challenged
practice).
299. I thank Professor Lillquist for this insight. This criticism grows stronger as any
definition of discrimination expands beyond animus. Thus, as scholarship seeks to expand the
concept of (or proof requisites for) discrimination, concerns about legitimacy increase. See, e.g.,
Barbara J. Flagg, "Was Blind, But Now ISee" White Race Consciousnessand the Requirement
of DiscriminatoryIntent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 987 (1993) ("[W]hites share no apparent
consensus concerning the morality of unconscious race discrimination .... The message that
unconscious discrimination, if it exists, is not (very) blameworthy makes less likely that
whites will cease to deny the existence of unconscious discrimination.").
300. In a somewhat different setting, the legitimacy debate has played out at length.
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rather than the strong moral beacon it has been since its
enactment. 0 1 The moral heights may already have been eroded,
however, by cognitive bias scholarship's identification of the central
problem of present-day discrimination as cognitive bias operating
through workplace dynamics and cultures. This Article does not
claim, as others have,3 °2 that cognitive bias is irremediable; rather,
this Article's point is simply that holding someone morally responsible for conduct of which they are not even aware is difficult. The
new scholarship has made discrimination more pervasive but less
evil.
V. REVIVING DISPARATE IMPACT
In short, this Article recommends a return to, and revival of, the
disparate impact theory. As Professor Krieger suggests, disparate
impact "as currently constructed"3 3 may not be adequate to the
task, but disparate impact holds a much brighter promise than does
Professor Calloway challenged the direction of the courts in disparate treatment cases as
moving away from the "basic assumption" that discrimination is prevalent. Calloway, supra
note 75, at 1008-09. While agreeing with this as a factual matter, Professor Malamud
disagreed with Calloway's contention that such a shift is objectionable. Malamud, supra note
75, at 2260. She critiqued scholars who "failo to acknowledge ...
that deciding cases on the
basis of a mandatory presumption that is inconsistent with contemporary beliefs about the
nature of discrimination raises important questions about the perceived legitimacy of the
enterprise." Id.; see also William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater,and Throwing Out Proof
Structures:It Is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POLY J. 361,
374-75 (1998) (disagreeing, "at least somewhat, ... that society does not believe that
intentional discrimination is still common in the workplace" and arguing that ignoring such
beliefs "is what the Court is supposed to do when society holds beliefs that would defeat
justice"); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Burdens of Equality: Burdens of Proof and
Presumptionsin Indian and American Civil Rights Law, 47 AM. J. COMP. L. 89, 121 (1999).
Malamud and Calloway are arguing over whether or not Title VII should still be
viewed as "transformative law," or whether it is now more accurately
characterized as "normal law," that is, law which seeks to enforce prevailing
social norms against a small, deviant class of lawbreakers. If Title VII is
properly seen as "normal law," than [sic] perhaps Professor Malamud is correct.
But if it is still "transformative law," than [sic] Professor Calloway has the
better argument.
Id.
301. Such an approach, however, has its advantages. See Poirier, supra note 36, at 464
(discussing the advantages of using a negligence model to hold employers liable for the
"dangerous condition" of cognitive bias in the workplace).
302. See Wax, supra note 44, at 1132-33.
303. Krieger, supranote 31, at 1231.
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either the current disparate treatment regime or various proposals
for expansion along the disparate treatment axis. In any event,
from the point of view of precedent, disparate impact is barely
constructed at all-the Supreme Court has yet to address the theory
under the 1991 amendments, and its encounter with § 703(m) in
Desert Palace34 suggests a willingness to renounce old positions
when confronted with a relatively clear congressional command.
Convincing the Court to apply the statute's language despite a few
restrictive circuit court decisions, °5 may be easier than persuading
the Court to reconsider, and radically expand, "intent" to discriminate.
With this introduction, this Article's proposal is simple, and has
largely been foreshadowed in the previous discussion: apply
disparate impact as the language of Title VII provides. The theory
is, unfortunately, a victim of its own origins, which evoke objective
polices, such as a test or height and weight requirements, that
sweep over large numbers of employees and disproportionately
exclude certain groups. And although this remains a significant area
of operation for the theory, a more significant potential use,
recognized by a unanimous Court in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank &
Trust,3°6 is to analyze "subjective or discretionary employment
practices." 30 7

Indeed, the facts of Watson suggest the theory's potential sweep.
Clara Watson did not challenge a formal policy of subjective
decisionmaking; rather, her attack was simply on the way things
were done at her place of employment. She had been denied
promotion on four occasions in an unstructured employment setting
in which all supervisors and her successful competitors were
white."' Although evidence of more conscious stereotyping existed,
304. See supra text accompanying notes 97-100.
305. See supra text accompanying notes 234-45.
306. 487 U.S. 977 (1988); see supra note 175.
307. Watson, 487 U.S. at 991.
308. Id. at 982. Clara Watson was hired as a proof operator in August 1973 and promoted
to drive-in teller in early 1976. Id. There her progress stalled:
In February 1980, she sought to become supervisor of the tellers in the main
lobby; a white male, however, was selected for this job. Watson then sought a
position as supervisor of the drive-in bank, but this position was given to a white
female. In February 1981, after Watson had served for about a year as a
commercial teller in the Bank's main lobby, and informally as assistant to the
supervisor of tellers, the man holding that position was promoted. Watson
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such a workplace had a strong potential for the kind of less conscious, more subtle bias that has been explored by the new scholarship. Despite writing before much of the new learning, Justice
O'Connor's opinion recognized as much: "It does not follow ...
that
the particular supervisors to whom this discretion is delegated
always act without discriminatory intent. Furthermore, even if one
assumed that any such discrimination can be adequately policed
through disparate treatment analysis, the problem of subconscious
stereotypes and prejudices would remain."3" 9 Very pointedly, she
went on: "In this case, ... petitioner was apparently told ...
that the
teller position was a big responsibility with 'a lot of money ...
for
blacks to have to count.' Such remarks may not prove discriminatory
intent, but they... suggest a lingering form of the problem that Title
VII was enacted to combat." 310
Thus, Watson envisions using disparate impact to subject such
employment practices to scrutiny. Although Justice O'Connor wrote
for a plurality that would have counterbalanced the sweeping
extension of disparate impact to subjective practices by simultaneously reducing the level of scrutiny and shifting the burden of
persuasion, 311 all nine Justices on the Court joined in this passage
about using disparate impact to deal with both hidden intentional
discrimination and "subconscious stereotypes and prejudices. 3 12
applied for the vacancy, but the white female who was the supervisor of the
drive-in bank was selected instead. Watson then applied for the vacancy created
at the drive-in; a white male was selected for that job.
Id. As described by the Court, the bank had only 80 employees and no "precise and formal
criteria for evaluating candidates" for the positions in question. Id. "It relied instead on the
subjective judgment of supervisors who were acquainted with the candidates and with the
nature of the jobs to be filled. All the supervisors involved in denying Watson the four
promotions at issue were white." Id.
309. Id. at 990.
310. Id. (citation omitted). The opinion went on:
If an employer's undisciplined system of subjective decisionmaking has precisely
the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissible intentional
discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII's proscription against
discriminatory actions should not apply. In both circumstances, the employer's
practices may be said to "adversely affect [an individual's] status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin."
Id. at 990-91.
311. Id. at 991-99; see also supra text accompanying note 176.
312. Watson, 487 U.S. at 990.
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And, of course, the 1991 Civil Rights Act, by essentially codifying
disparate impact as it existed prior to Wards Cove, necessarily wrote
into the statute books the extension of the theory to subjective
practices3 13 while rejecting Wards Cove's revision of Griggs.3 14 From
the plurality's view in Watson, the result is the worst of all worlds:
a sweeping and demanding theory of disparate impact.
But from the perspective of plaintiffs and most commentators,
this is a consummation devoutly to be wished. The common ground
of the cognitive bias scholarship, and much of the old concern with
the "basic assumption" underlying McDonnell Douglas, is that
women and racial minorities get the short end of the stick in a wide
range of workplaces. Although the precise causal mechanisms are
contested, disparate impact analysis focuses on this reality and asks
the employer to justify it by its business needs.
Because Watson could certainly have been framed as a disparate
treatment case, it necessarily implies that a wide variety of claims
now prosecuted under the disparate treatment paradigm could be
reframed as disparate impact challenges. Professor Shoben so
argues, citing Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters3 1 as "[p]erhaps
the most prominent case to have missed an opportunity to use
disparate impact.""'6 Furnco was a "cronyism" case;31 7 that is, the
supervisor hired workers he knew, and those workers happened to
be white. Professor Shoben could also have cited the personal
animosity cases in which the court concludes that personal
318
animosity and not discrimination motivated the decisionmaker.

313. A more detailed discussion of the extent to which the 1991 Act codified the disparate
impact theory is found in Sullivan, supranote 148, at 1520-22.
314. See supra text accompanying note 196.
315. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
316. Shoben, supranote 226, at 607.
317. Id. at 611. See generally Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and
Affirmative Action: A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and RaceConscious Decision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1003 (1997) (analyzing the
current framework for examining race-based and race-neutral decision making in employment
contexts, and arguing that the cronyism defense has emerged as a result of recent Supreme
Court decisions that narrowed unnecessarily the requirement of intent under Title VII).

318. See Derum & Engle, supra note 27, at 1180-82 (arguing that courts increasingly view
interpersonal problems as a result of personal animosity, and that such a presumption,
"bespeaks both a judicial inability, or at least refusal, to attend to unconscious bias and an
ideological commitment to employment at will").

988

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:911

St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks3 19 is paradigmatic of such cases. In
that case, the supervisor fired plaintiff because he did not like him,
that is, the district court found that the supervisor fired a worker he
disliked who happened to be black. ° In both Furnco and Hicks,
plaintiffs lost because the reason for the employer's decision,
however unfair, was not "racial." Neither favoring friends or
acquaintances who happen to be white nor disliking individuals who
happen to be black is disparate treatment discrimination.
Both cases could be recast as disparate impact claims, with
plaintiffs arguing that the employer's policy of allowing its agents
to make decisions on grounds other than merit will have a disparity
of impact on African Americans. In Furnco,the "particular employment practice" would have been instructing the foreman to choose
workers from among those he knew; in Hicks, it would have been
allowing supervisors to discharge individuals for reasons of personal
animosity, rather than reasons related to job performance. So
framed, both situations involve "particular employment practices"
subject to disparate impact attack. If an impact were shown, a
defendant would be likely to prove a business necessity for permit321
ting determinations to be made without regard to merit.
Of course, to invoke § 703(k), a plaintiff must prove that such
policies have a disparate impact. Professor Shoben is probably
correct that, in Furnco, traditional statistical proof could have
shown that allowing a white foreman to choose from among
individuals he had worked with in a highly exclusionary industry
would have a disproportionate, adverse effect on blacks.3 22
Hicks is more difficult to cast as a disparate impact case because
the plaintiff would have had to prove that allowing supervisors to
fire people they disliked would result in disproportionately more
319. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
320. Id. at 508.
321. This is true even if, for example, the employer could demonstrate some search cost
savings in allowing a supervisor to choose workers he knows. Unless those costs were
significant, which seems unlikely, they should not rise to business necessity. But cf. EEOC
v. Consol. Serv. Sys., 989 F.2d 233, 236 (7th Cir. 1993) (commenting that not only is word of
mouth hiring a cheap method of recruiting, but it may be highly effective in obtaining a good
workforce in part because "an applicant referred by an existing employee is likely to get a
franker, more accurate, more relevant picture of working conditions than if he learns about
the job from an employment agency, a newspaper ad, or a hiring supervisor," thus increasing
the probability of a good match).
322. Shoben, supra note 226, at 609- 10.
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African Americans being discharged.32 3 Some would argue that such
proof will often be impossible. There are two responses. First, from
the traditional statistical perspective, impact might not be provable
if "the numbers" are too small to draw statistical conclusions.32 4 But
the difficulty of proving the impact of employment practices is
sometimes misunderstood. In Watson, for example, the defendant
had only eighty employees. A showing of impact in that case would
have had to rest on relatively small numbers if focused on only the
employer itself. The history of disparate impact, however, suggests
that such a focus is not necessary. Griggs itself did not look to the
effect of the employer's test and high school diploma requirement on
Duke Power's present employees or applicants." 5
Second, nothing in the statutory language requires that a plaintiff
use a particular kind of proof to establish disparate impact.
Although disparate impact has been traditionally established by
statistical proof of the effect of employer policies on either the
employer's own workforce, as in Teal, or some proxy workforce, as
in Dothard, expert testimony coming out of the new cognitive bias
scholarship could establish the likelihood of such an impact.3 2 That
323. Hicks actually raises another question-the possibility of using both disparate
treatment and disparate impact in tandem. The employer did not claim to have a policy
permitting personal animosity; indeed, the supervisor denied such animosity. Plaintiff
attempted to prove disparate treatment, but the trial judge found mere personal animosity
(despite the supervisor's denial) and not racial motivation. Under Hicks itself, this put paid
to the disparate treatment claim. But had plaintiff raised the disparate impact theory as an
alternative theory of liability, presumably the judge would have had to go on to decide
whether permitting personal animosity discharges was a particular employment practice with
a disparate impact on African Americans.
324. See Flagg, supranote 47, at 2025.
Inferences based on small samples can be misleading because they may suggest
short-term results that will not hold true over a longer period; or, to put it
somewhat differently, the effect of a particular employment practice on two
individuals may not look the same as the effect of that practice on two hundred
persons.
Id.
325. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-31 (1971); see also Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (holding that use of "generalized national statistics" was
sufficient to support a finding that Alabama's height and weight requirements had a disparate
here is no requirement... that a statistical showing of disproportionate
effect on women, as "[t]
impact must always be based on analysis of the characteristics of actual applicants").
326. Professor Shoben, supranote 226, at 606, notes that some disparate impact cases have
been proven entirely without regard to statistics. As an example, she cites Garciav. Woman's
Hospitalof Texas, 97 F.3d 810 (5th Cir. 1996), where the Fifth Circuit held that accepting the
testimony of its plaintiffs proposed expert witness "that no pregnant woman would be advised
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is, after all, its raison d'etre. Although it has been noted that using
expert witnesses to prove cognitive biases and workplace dynamics
raises its own challenges,32 v these are no greater in the disparate
impact context than in the disparate treatment context. Indeed, the
problems may be considerably fewer for disparate impact for three
reasons. First, the expertise seems more directed at the theory of
disparate impact-broad tendencies, not individual decisions-and
therefore seems more apposite. Second, judges may be more
disposed to admit such evidence in bench trials than in jury trials.3 28
Finally, admitting such testimony becomes easier when the result
is not to automatically impose liability but to move the analysis to
the question of whether such processes are justified despite the
proven tendency.3 29
Although Furncoand Hicks each involved a single decision, each
seems to be a plausible candidate for disparate impact analysis. Of
course, if the decision in question is truly anomalous-with the vast
majority of decisions being made on the merits-a disparate impact
will not exist. Indeed, the cases of discrimination that will evade
review under this approach are mainly ad hoc and isolated instances involving employers who otherwise have "good stats."
Because individual disparate treatment remains available to
challenge the rogue supervisor in an otherwise responsive employer,
such a result does not leave the plaintiff any worse off than under
the disparate treatment theory.3 3 °
by her doctor to lift 150 pounds ...
would have been sufficient to establish causation between
the hospital's lifting requirement and the disparate impact," id. at 814; see also Pietras v. Bd.
of Fire Comm'rs, 180 F.3d 468, 474-75 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that expert testimony of the
effect of tests in other fire departments was sufficient to prove that defendant's test had a
disparate impact despite a "small numbers" problem); United States v. City of Warren, 138
F.3d 1083, 1093-94 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that labor market statistical evidence is not
always necessary to demonstrate disparate impact); cf. Flagg, supra note 47, at 2040
(suggesting that one can identify facially neutral criteria as having "foreseeable disparate
effects" where "the criterion [is] associated with whites to a greater extent than with
nonwhites and ...
[is] favorably regarded by whites"). Professor Flagg views "foreseeable
impact" as requiring adjustment to current disparate impact doctrine. See Flagg, supra note
47, at 2038. While I agree that this is an appropriate approach, I do not see it as opposed to
any current "requirement" of the law.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 142-47.
328. While there is no formal difference between the admissibility of testimony before
judges and juries, one might anticipate more leeway in bench trials.
329. See infra text accompanying notes 341-43.
330. In an earlier article, I argued that constitutional concerns may lead to disparate
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Other scholars have suggested different ways to frame workplace
structures to invoke disparate impact. Professor Michelle Travis
argues that disparate impact might allow challenges to telecommuting, 3 1 which she documents as increasing gender inequality
in the workplace rather than, as many hoped, freeing women to
combine family and profession more easily.3 3 2 Seeking to exploit
"antidiscrimination law's untapped transformative potential,"3 3' 3
Professor Travis urges applying disparate impact, either by
challenging two-tier structures of telecommuting that favor higher
level workers, who are mostly male, and exploit lower level workers,
who are mostly female,33 4 or by showing that "employers treat
telecommuters worse than non-telecommuters who are performing

impact being available to whites and males. See generally Sullivan, supranote 148 (discussing
this question and the evolution of the law over time). While that remains true, the cognitive
biases approach to disparate impact will for the most part be available only to women and
minorities, although whites and males might be able to apply these theories to nontraditional
settings.
331. See Michelle A. Travis, Equality in the Virtual Workplace, 24 BERKELEY J. EMP. &LAB.
L. 283, 288 (2003); see also Selmi, supranote 38, at 31 (discussing, while not using the term
"disparate impact," how women's childcare commitments result in a "blurring of lines as to
what constitutes discrimination," as neutral institutional structures such as demanding work
hours or inefficient employment practices that rely on outdated modes of operation are seen
as the source of persistent inequalities).
332. Professor Travis argues:
[T]elecommuting appears to be magnifying the existing gender segregation and
hierarchy in the paid labor market because employers have developed two
distinct types of telecommuting arrangements that affect men and women
differently. For the predominantly male population of high-level professionals,
employers use telecommuting as a benefit that gives workers increased choice,
flexibility, and autonomy. In contrast, for the predominantly female population
of low-level clerical workers, employers use telecommuting to increase
managerial control and reduce costs, resulting in decreased pay, benefits,
autonomy, job security, and advancement opportunities.
Travis, supra note 331, at 285 (footnote omitted).
333. Id. at 288. Professor Travis finds expansion of disparate impact theory to restructure
the workplace more politically viable than seeking to require employers to "accommodate"
caregiving along the lines of the ADA's requirement of accommodation of disabilities. Id. at
324-28; see also Nadine Taub, The Relevance of DisparateImpact Analysis in Reaching for
Gender Equality, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 941, 949 (1996) ("Furthermore, because the
remedies for norms and standards reflecting society's male tilt are thoughtful efforts at truly
neutral policies and practices and not efforts at accommodating or compensating one sex only,
...[the disparate impact] approach does not run the risk of reinforcing or reintroducing
stereotypes.").
334. Travis, supra note 331, at 343.
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the same job."33' 5 These practices affect "women disproportionately
because women make up the majority of telecommuters in nonprofessional jobs." '36
Still other commentators argue for analyzing sexual harassment
at least in part under the disparate impact model,3 3 7 for recasting

335. Id. at 344.
336. Id. Professor Travis stresses that "[b]ecause disparate impact thcory eliminates the
underlying practice, rather than merely granting individual exceptions, it can result in
broader changes" while allowing "members of the majority group who do not fit the majority
norms-e.g., male workers who have or who want to have significant caregiving
responsibilities-to benefit." Id. at 330. That disparate impact will necessarily benefit all
groups, not merely the race or gender raising the challenge, seems correct. But see Jolls, supra
note 11, at 655 (examining disparate impact challenges to no-beard rules on the grounds that
black males are more likely to be medically restricted in shaving than are white males).
Professor Jolls finds that the typical remedy is to require "employers to exempt black men
who are unable to shave from rules prohibiting beards. Thus, quite directly in these cases,
disparate impact liability requires employers to incur special costs in response to the
distinctive needs (measured against existing market structures) of a particular group of
employees." Id. (footnote omitted) Jolls's analysis, however, is flawed. While a court might
rightly limit the relief ordered to the violation shown, it would be a foolhardy employer who
would refuse to exempt a white male with a comparable skin condition from the no-beard rule.
Such conduct might not be contempt of the court order, but it would almost certainly be
actionable disparate treatment of the white male on racial grounds. See Stewart J. Schwab
& Steven L. Willborn, ReasonableAccommodation of Workplace Disabilities,44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1197, 1238 (2003) (disagreeing with Jolla's conclusions and noting that "[tihe standard
judicial remedy in a Title VII disparate impact case requires the employer to change the policy
or standard for everybody, not just the protected group").
337. See, e.g., Hdbert, supra note 281, at 345-46 (arguing that in those harassment cases
where there is no intent to discriminate on the basis of sex and no different treatment,
"disparate impact might appropriately be used to challenge the sexually harassing behavior");
Kelly Cahill Timmons, Sexual Harassment and Disparate Impact: Should Non-Targeted
Workplace Sexual Conduct Be Actionable Under Title VI?, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1152, 1155 (2003)
("[N]on-targeted sexual conduct in the workplace should be actionable only if the conduct's
disproportionate impact on women is great."); see also Charles R. Calleros, Title VII and the
First Amendment: Content-Neutral Regulation, Disparate Impact, and the "Reasonable
Person," 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1249-50 (1997) (concluding that, while applying disparate
impact to pure speech "raises more serious First Amendment concerns than does liability for
[targeted] harassing speech, ... the main obstacle to relief ought to be in establishing the
disparate impact as a factual matter rather than in confirming disparate impact analysis as
a generally available theory of relief' (footnote omitted)); Robert A. Kearney, The Disparate
Impact Hostile Environment Claim: Sexual Harassment Scholarship at a Crossroads, 20
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 185, 224-25 (2003) (suggesting that, if one assumes that sexual
speech impacts women more than men, "[a] better argument (though ultimately not
persuasive ... ) ... [is] that traditional disparate impact analysis provides the better basis for
a plaintiffs claim"). But see Steven L. Willborn, Taking DiscriminationSeriously: Oncale and
the Fateof Exceptionalism in Sexual Harassment Law, 7 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 677, 688
n.45 (1999) ('The disparate impact model is generally inapplicable in harassment cases.").
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disparate impact theory in light of the language of the 1991 Civil
Rights Act,338 or for using disparate impact to challenge discrimination against certain cultural practices to avoid essentializing
them. 339 Each of these arguments is worth taking seriously in an
effort to revive the theory.
Of course, turning to disparate impact will impose higher costs on
plaintiffs than current disparate treatment litigation, which some
commentators view as a serious problem with expanding the
theory. 4 ° Litigating under the disparate impact model will necessarily require expert testimony, whether of the traditional statistical
kind or of cognitive biases. But this objection is no greater than for
those who would deploy cognitive bias expertise in pursuit of the
disparate treatment mirage.
The final problem for disparate impact may largely explain why
litigators and commentators have shied away from the theory:
section 703(k) explicitly allows a defendant to justify disparities of
impact. From a plaintiffs perspective, once she establishes disparate treatment, the case is largely over. Though the defendant might
theoretically establish a defense to liability,34 ' this is not a realistic
risk in most cases. More likely, the employer might establish the
"same decision" limitation on remedies, but the plaintiff will still
obtain attorneys fees and an injunction.34 2 In contrast, a disparate
impact plaintiff can prevail in showing a particular employment
practice has the requisite impact and still lose when the defendant
carries its burden as to business necessity and job relation. Obviously, the more plausibly justifiable the employer's implicated
338. E.g., Zimmer, supra note 200, at 473 (noting that since the amended statute does not
require any showing of group impact for its alternative practices prong, its plain language
permits an individual to establish a disparate impact claim "simply by proving: (1) that the
employer took adverse action against the plaintiff based on an 'employment practice;' (2) that
an alternative practice exists that serves the employer's interests yet would not adversely
affect the plaintiff; and (3) that the employer refuses to adopt the better alternative").
339. E.g., Roberto J. Gonzalez, supra note 50, at 2221 ('The disparate impact approach to
workplace assimilation is preferable ...
because it does not demand that plaintiffs produce a
narrative of racial essence in order to obtain protection."); see also Yuracko, supra note 50
(arguing that Title VII should prohibit irrational trait discrimination whenever it adversely
impacts members of a traditionally disadvantaged racial or ethnic group, in part to avoid
essentialism).
340. See, e.g., Krieger, supranote 31, at 1238-39.
341. See supra note 127.
342. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text.
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practices, the more likely the plaintiff would prefer a disparate
treatment attack.
Beyond this practical problem, some commentators find the
business necessity defense the main theoretical reason to avoid
disparate impact. For example, Professor Krieger sees a no-win
forced choice: either requiring businesses, especially small businesses, to conduct expensive validation studies to establish business
necessity or watering down the defendant's burden of proof to the
point of meaninglessness. "Either the [disparate impact] model will
be relegated to a narrowing range of cases, as already appears to be
occurring, or its application will place severe and ultimately
unworkable burdens on employers in the fastest-growing and most
34 Professor
promising segments of the national labor market.""
Krieger is correct that formal validation, as it is employed in
disparate impact cases challenging testing regimes, will not be
required across the spectrum of disparate impact cases. Since
Griggs, testing has been subjected to much more onerous and
empirical requirements than have other practices subject to
disparate impact analysis.3 4 4 But many cases have always approached business necessity from a more qualitative, less empirical,
perspective.34
Professor Krieger fears that this latter path leads to Wards
Cove-if not to the shift of the burden of persuasion at least to the
more relaxed notion of whether the practice is in fact necessary.34 6
Her fears are not unwarranted, and this Article does not propose a
solution as to precisely what should count as proving business
necessity when testing validation is not invoked. But the new vision
with which Professor Krieger's scholarship is concerned necessarily
requires much more of a balancing of discriminatory forces with
343. Krieger, supra note 31, at 1237.
344. See generally 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supra note 109, § 4.05 (discussing
employee testing and issues of proof related to employment tests).
345. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick v. City of Atlanta, 2 F.3d 1112, 1118 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding
that defendant carries its defense when it shows that "the practice or action is necessary to
meeting a goal that, as a matter of law, qualifies as an important business goal for Title VII
purposes"); see also Smith v. City of Des Moines, 99 F.3d 1466, 1471, 1473 (8th Cir. 1996)
(holding that city did not discriminate against plaintiff by requiring plaintiff to pass a physical
fitness test). See generally 1 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supranote 109, § 4.03[c] (discussing
job relatedness and business necessity defenses).
346. Krieger, supra note 31, at 1237.
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business needs than was true when discrimination meant animus
and no need existed to tolerate such motivations at play in our
society. Professor Green, for example, recognizes that the workplace
cultures that enable bias also serve important functions for both
employers and employees and should be tamed, not dictated by the
law.347 Similarly, Professor Sturm resists flat prohibitions in favor
of more nuanced development in the workplace. 8 ' Precisely such an
approach is permitted by a more flexible business necessity doctrine
in service to the disparate impact model.
In short, this Article argues that the dilution of business necessity, which Krieger fears, may in fact be the way out of the desert.
Both Professors Green and Sturm argue for an approach that
balances discriminatory impulses against employer needs, in large
part because of the lack of clarity on how employers can deal
effectively with cognitive biases enabled through workplace
dynamics and cultures. 9 But the difficulties of dealing with such
biases do not change by describing them as problems of disparate
treatment or disparate impact, and disparate impact offers an
opportunity to explicitly weigh the necessity of current practices
that are shown to enable bias.
This "structural turn" has generated pointed criticism by
Professor Bagenstos. Although he recognizes an appeal in the
predicates of the new scholarship, he argues that it does not offer a
normative explanation about why unconscious bias should be
actionable,. ° nor a clear answer to "what's an employer to do" in
347. See Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 32, at 108 (discussing the role of
subjectivity and discretion in certain workplaces).
348. See Sturm, supra note 33, at 522 (discussing the relationship between judicial norms
and workplace-generated approaches).
349. This at least in part underlies Professor Green's opposition to disparate impact: that
doctrine tends to "a dichotomous decision. Either the job requirement or employment practice
that has an adverse impact can be justified in terms of business necessity ... or the job
requirement cannot be so justified, and thus its use amounts to unlawful discrimination .... "
Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 32, at 143. Rather than dealing with the problem
along dichotomous lines, "we need to begin exploring the ways in which employers can be held
accountable for managing diversity within modern structures and practices to minimize the
operation of discriminatory bias." Id.
350. Bagenstos, supranote 8 (manuscript at 53) ("If antidiscrimination law is to respond
to such bias effectively, the concept of wrongful discrimination must expand to embrace not
simply the deviant acts of especially immoral people but the everyday actions of virtually all
of us.").
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light of the new scholarship.3 5 ' Although most of his criticism is
aimed at those scholars who attempt to refashion disparate
treatment, those who look to disparate impact, as this Article does,
are subject to similar criticism." 2
The criticism that cognitive bias scholarship does not provide a
normative justification for expanding the definition of discrimination to include unconscious motivations is puzzling. The basic
normative justification is the same as for any discrimination-to
prevent both the unfairness and the economic costs of individuals
being judged based on characteristics that should be irrelevant to
productivity, even if the "judging" is unconscious. Cognitive bias is
as normatively objectionable when it results in discriminatory
employment decisions as when it results in erroneous criminal
convictions.35 It may be, of course, that neither the courts nor the
public accept the scholarship, but this is a question of the public
acceptance of the theory, not a normative one. In this regard,
increasing recognition of cognitive bias in a wide range of human
activities3 54 should pave the way for greater judicial acceptance.

351. Id. at 45 (arguing that the absence of a definition of what counts as unlawful
discrimination or as to when an employer has done enough to counteract it "render[s] almost
nonsensical the job that participants in the structural turn would impose on the judiciary").
352. Id. at 56 (stating that the proposal presented in this Article "seems to me entirely too
optimistic" in light of the lack of success of the theory since the 1991 Civil Rights Act).
353. See Darryl K. Brown, Rationing Criminal Defense Entitlements: An Argument from
InstitutionalDesign, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 801, 826-27 (2004) (footnotes omitted).
Attorneys, like everyone else, are susceptible to cognitive biases. There are wellestablished patterns of poor probabilistic judgment, for example, that likely
affect attorneys who handle lots of cases. Lawyers, like others, devise heuristics
for quick judgments that will sometimes conflict with default rules and
empirically grounded probabilities about risks. "Belief perseverance" and
"confirmatory biases" are also common; once we form hypotheses or explanations
about how things work, those understandings are hard to revise--we tend to
ignore or downplay contradictory evidence and misread information as
supportive of the initial idea. Related to this is widespread "optimistic bias,"
which describes the tendency of people to think they are better than average at
many tasks, or that future events are likely to turn out better than actuarial
probabilities predict. This can lead lawyers to assume their practice of quick file
review with little investigation results in few errors, on the assumption that a
veteran's insights compensate for time-consuming diligence.
Id.
354. See, e.g., Adam J. Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331 (2003)
(discussing the ways in which cognitive limitations and bounded rationality affect
lawmakers).
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Although he does not frame it this way, Professor Bagenstos's
normative critique is closer to the mark in suggesting that structural scholars, this Article's author included, have no answer to the
question, how much discriminationis too much? Whether aimed at
the disparate treatment advocates, such as Sturm and Green, or at
disparate impact proponents, it is a fair criticism. Our approaches
would both permit much discrimination (whether defined in terms
of cognitive bias or adverse impact) to continue while simply trying
to deal with those manifestations that can be managed by employers.
Although it is tempting to answer the criticism simply by
responding that the alternatives proposed are the best of a bad lot,
Professor Bagenstos's question deserves a better response. That
answer is simply that cost-benefit analysis, which is common to the
structural theories, is the only way to begin addressing a deeprooted problem and thereby continue the process of "debiasing" the
workplace. The legal system certainly has no lack of ad hoc balancing methods, often camouflaged under the term "reasonable." Thus,
"reasonableness" often serves in torts for a kind of cost-benefit
analysis, which is informed by what is technologically possible at
the current time, not what is currently done.3 55 In antitrust, the
"rule of reason" for a restraint of trade is a label pasted on what is
often a rough-and-ready balancing of pro- and anticompetitive
tendencies in a given area.35 6
In the discrimination arena, this balancing will be done in terms
of business necessity, and most likely in terms of whether the
employer is dealing as effectively as possible with the phenomenon
in light of the currently available alternatives. Although critics such
as Professor Bagenstos are correct that sometimes this yields hard
cases, there will also be easy ones: it would be hard for the employ355. See The T. J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1932) ("Indeed, in most cases
reasonable prudence is in fact common prudence; but strictly it is never its measure; a whole
calling may have unduly lagged in the adoption of new and available devices .... IThere are
precautions so imperative that even their universal disregard will not excuse their
omission."). See generally Robert A. Prentice & Jonathan J. Koehler, A Normality Bias in
Legal Decision Making, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 583 (2003) (exploring the cognitive bias in favor
of the "normal").
356. See generally Fred S. McChesney, Talking 'BoutMy Antitrust Generation:Competition
for and in the Field of Competition Law, 52 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1405 (2003) (describing the
efforts of courts to create a single analytic rule to balance pro- and anticompetitive factors).
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ers in Furncoand Hicks to defend slapdash practices of hiring and
discharge.35 7
Is there any reason to believe judges are prepared to engage in
this exercise in any meaningful way? Much of this Article has been
premised on the notion that federal judges are hostile to discrimination. claims, thus making disparate treatment a pretty dry hole.
Although one might suspect a similar antipathy toward expanding
disparate impact, at least some reasons exist to believe that this
approach may be more palatable.
First, the fact that disparate impact is not an absolute prohibition
but a balancing of adverse effect and business justifications makes
it a more attractive avenue in the present political climate than
disparate treatment. Second, because juries are not involved,
judges keep control of the process which should assuage their
fears of jury irrationality. Third, to find disparate treatment in any
given case, judges essentially have to label the employer as a racist
or a sexist, or allow a jury to do so. To find disparate impact, judges
need to merely find that the employer was, in effect, careless.
Fourth, disparate treatment requires federal judges to suspend
their intuition that discrimination, as they define it, is uncommon;
disparate impact merely requires them to engage in a kind of
technical regulation of workplace practices. Finally, disparate
impact allows a more nuanced judicial control over remedies than
does disparate treatment. Although a verdict of disparate treatment
discrimination results in compensatory and punitive damages
against the employer (unless, as Professor Green argues, a new
remedial scheme is simultaneously created as a compliment to new
liability regimes).. disparate impact offers only backpay, which may
357. This is not to say that word-of-mouth hiring, a version of which was involved in

F7urnco, see supra notes 315-17 and accompanying text, could never be justified as business
necessity. But even Judge Posner's paean to this practice in EEOC V. ConsolidatedService
Systems, 989 F.2d 233, 235-36 (7th Cir. 1993), was uttered in trying to explain why the
practice did not demonstrate intent to discriminate.
358. See Green, Workplace Dynamics, supra note 32, at 150. Professor Green writes that
her approach
would recognize that there may be some real limits on the ability of employers
to control for individual bias. The goal would be to create incentives for problem
solving within institutions without delegitimizing the task by holding employers
liable for forms of discrimination over which they have no realistic means of
control.
Id.; see also Green, Work Culture,supranote 32, at 625-26 (arguing for an employer obligation
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be limited by the judge's equitable discretion." 9 Similarly, equitable
relief may be tailored to the violation found, taking into account the
practicalities of the employer's situation.
This approach means that the courts will not use disparate
impact to transform the workplace as Professor Travis urges,
arguing that the "full-time face-time norm" for most businesses is
the product of history rather than necessity." ° Although recognizing
the limited success of efforts to use disparate impact to change
workplace rules that adversely impact women because of family
responsibilities, despite a long history of scholars calling for
precisely such an approach, 6 ' she argues:
Under the transformative approach, judges would distinguish
a job's actual required tasks from the malleable organizational
norms governing the when, where, and how of task performance,
and they would treat the latter as particular practices regarding
the former. When women challenge an exclusionary default
structure, such as the full-time face-time norm, this approach
would characterize the default workplace structure as a proper
subject for disparate impact review .... This approach would force
employers to demonstrate a business justification in order to

to address discriminatory effects of workplace cultures but not necessarily to require any
change in them).
359. 2 SULLIVAN, ZIMMER & WHITE, supranote 109, § 13.09.
360. Travis, supra note 282, at 10 ("[Full-time face-time has become not just the way that
successful companies currently are designed, but also the way that they should and must be
designed."); see also Chamallas, supra note 291, at 596.
The authors effectively challenge the image of employers as passively paying the
going rate for labor, much like stock investors pay the current price for shares
of stock. Instead, the image that emerges from the case studies is of employers
ruled as much by the pay bureaucracies within their own organizations, as by
outside forces.
Id.
361. E.g., Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discriminationand the Transformation of Workplace
Norms, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1196 (1989); Rachel Arnow-Richman, Accommodation
Subverted. The Future of Work/Family Initiatives in a "Me, Inc." World, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN &
L. 345,363 (2003); Candace Saari Kovacic-Fleischer, LitigatingAgainstEmployment Penalties
for Pregnancy,Breastfeeding,and Childcare, 44 VILL. L. REV. 355, 356 (1999). But see Nancy
E. Dowd, Work and Family: The Gender Paradox and the Limitations of Discrimination
Analysis in Restructuring the Workplace, 24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 154 (1989) (stating
that discrimination analysis has failed to restructure the workplace to accommodate workfamily conflicts); Joan Williams, Market Work and Family Work in the 21st Century, 44 VILL.
L. REv. 305,335-36 (1999) (notingthe disadvantages of employment discrimination litigation).
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resist workplace3 62restructuring and retain an exclusionary
workplace norm.
Although Professor Travis believes this approach is well-grounded
in Title VII's language, few courts have so read the statute because
most frame the full-time face-time norm as part of the job itself, not
as a "practice" for organizing work. Such courts "are ignoring the
transformative and integrationist potential that Congress implicitly
endorsed when courts interpret the 'particular employment practice'
language to exclude structural and organizational aspects of the
workplace that act as 'barriers' and 'built-in-headwinds' for women
with caregiving responsibilities." '
Although the transformative view is the ideal, the perfect may be
the enemy of the possible in the world of antidiscrimination law.
Courts are more likely to take small steps in dealing with the very
real problems that Professor Travis addresses if a less transformative model is adopted.
CONCLUSION

Surprising unanimity exists among the commentators that the
law is far behind the times with respect to workplace discrimination. Traditional doctrines result in relatively few verdicts for
plaintiffs, despite strong reason to believe that discrimination is
pervasive. Although some dispute exists about the extent that
discrimination has changed dramatically in kind from animus to
cognitive bias, near unanimity exists that current doctrines do not
adequately address either old- or new-fashioned discrimination. The
division of opinion, therefore, lies less with the problem than with
the solution. Departing from current approaches that try to redesign
the disparate treatment paradigm, this Article argues for renewed
interest in disparate impact.
Under such an approach, many of the problems sketched above
disappear. First, consider unconscious discrimination. To the extent
that this mechanism disadvantages particular employees, one
should expect, say, to see fewer women in higher positions. A
362. Travis, supra note 282, at 39.
363. Id. at 79.
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plaintiff challenging such a scenario would not have to prove that
any particular individual discriminated against her-she would
simply have to show that women were disproportionately
underrepresented at higher levels in the company and, if possible,
demonstrate what practice(s) caused this result. Whether the
ultimate cause was animus, rational discrimination, conscious or
unconscious stereotyping, workplace dynamics, or workplace culture
would not matter, or at least it would not matter if the results could
be attributed to employer action. Similarly, the question of whether
certain traits were "racial" or "gender" traits would tend to disappear. To the extent that a certain trait or practice was more
prevalent in one race or sex, relying on that trait would result in
discrimination "because of' the prohibited ground. There would be
no need to essentialize a race or gender in terms of such traits; 364 at
most, there would be a requirement to identify a correlation
between race or gender and the absence of employment opportunities. From this perspective, Title VII becomes a risk-allocation
statute. Women, for example, are at greater risk of having fewer
employment opportunities than men. The risk might arise from
male hostility, from rational discrimination, or from cognitive
processing schemas. It might also arise from ways in which women
actually differ from men at this point in history such that using
certain criteria for decisionmaking enhances the risk of lost
opportunities. The employer's responsibility under Title VII is to
minimize that risk to the maximum extent consistent with its
business interests.
This Article does not pretend that this perspective accurately
reflects the law as it now exists, nor that the perspective is without
its difficulties. The chief disadvantage is to cut Title VII loose from
its moral moorings-it becomes another regulatory mechanism for
the workplace rather than the moral imperative it now represents.
And I do not claim that this approach is entirely new. Professor
David Oppenheimer analyzed discrimination as negligence more
than a decade ago,365 and there are those who have argued for a
364. See supra text accompanying notes 49-50.
365. David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Negligent Discrimination,141 U. PA. L. REV. 899,96970 (1993).
Whenever an employer fails to act to prevent discrimination which it knows, or
should know, is occurring, which it expects to occur, or which it should expect to
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regulatory approach to the problem. 36 6 This Article's argument is
more limited and indeed, more doctrinal. Given the demands of the
new learning, this Article asks how current doctrine can best
accommodate the necessary changes. This Article's answer departs
radically from many prior perspectives, almost all of which either
seek to expand the individual disparate treatment paradigm or call
for legislative solutions that are unlikely to be adopted. Although
courts may be unwilling to adopt this Article's proposals, the
expansion of disparate impact is the more likely route to reform in
part because it hews more closely to the statutory text and in part
because it requires less unsettling of embedded expectations.

occur, it should be held negligent. Liability should also be recognized when an
employer breaches the statutorily established standard of care by making
employment decisions which have a discriminatory effect, without first
scrutinizing its processes, searching for less discriminatory alternatives, and
examining its own motives for evidence of stereotyping.
Id.
366. E.g., Poirier, supra note 36 (arguing for using a type of negligence model to combat
workplace discrimination).

